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Decoupling Taxes and Marriage: Beyond Innocence
and Income Splitting
Michelle Lyon Drumbl*

Abstract

Fourteen years ago, members of Congress sympathetically listened as
divorcees testified to their struggles to raise children while being pursued by the
Internal Revenue Service for tax debts, often unknown to them, that were
attributable to their ex-husbands' income. Rather than adopting one of many
proposals to end joint and several liability, Congress instead elected to expand
the grounds on which these individuals could seek relief from such liability. Since
that time, taxpayers have seen a steady expansion of the grounds for so-called
“innocent spouse relief” that has evolved through a combination of legislative,
administrative, and judicial action. Yet the process for relief remains timeconsuming, inefficient, and unpredictable. The majority of initial requests for
innocent spouse relief are denied. The taxpayer can appeal administratively and
also seek judicial review if relief is denied, but sometimes will spend several years
and untold resources in pursuit of a claim that may ultimately be unsuccessful.
The process is also a questionable use of Internal Revenue Service personnel, in
that it frequently calls upon these employees to address the most intimate aspects
of a failed relationship, including spousal abuse, addictions, and mental health
problems. These employees often must make a determination based upon a “hesaid, she-said” presentation of the facts—an odd task for an agency charged with
enforcing the revenue laws.
This article visits the historic rationales for joint and several liability, both
in light of the flawed relief process and also in the context of modern-day
American society, in which married couples constitute only half of all households
and cohabitation is increasingly more common. I conclude that Congress should
eliminate the “married” filing statuses and require each married individual to file
a separate return. If it did so, joint liability and the innocent spouse relief
process would both cease to exist. The historical policy justifications for
imposing joint and several liability are no longer rational in light of changed
demographics and technological advances. Rather than an “unusual privilege,”
which it was long said to be, filing jointly has become a risky conundrum,
particularly for low-income taxpayers. As the nation debates tax reform, it is
*
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appropriate to rethink the policy of retaining the “married” filing statuses in light
of the ways in which family structures, society, and the Internal Revenue Code
have changed since joint and several liability was introduced in 1938.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
Married taxpayers have two options when filing a federal income tax return: (1)
file a joint return, in which case the taxpayers agree to joint and several liability for any
tax due;1 or (2) file separate returns by electing the “married filing separately” status. It
is estimated that joint returns typically comprise ninety-five percent of the income tax
returns filed by married taxpayers.2 The Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) does not favor
married taxpayers who file separately; except in very unusual circumstances,3 these
taxpayers will face a higher tax liability by choosing this filing status.4 Thus, it is almost
always in a married couple’s collective financial interest to file a joint return. However,
if the couple files jointly and then later divorces, the Internal Revenue Service
(“Service”) can pursue collection efforts for the joint years against either or both
taxpayers simultaneously, regardless of which spouse’s income created the liability.
One of the simplest and most automated types of collection activity is the refund
offset: the Service will apply an income tax refund expected from one year (in whole or
in part) to satisfy an outstanding tax liability from a different year.5 Thus, in many cases
involving divorced couples with minor children, the Service will seize the sizable
refundable tax credits due to the low-to-middle-income custodial parent in satisfaction of
a past debt that, while joint, is wholly attributable to the income of the noncustodial
parent.6 Even if the noncustodial parent is making periodic payments towards the
liability, whether voluntarily (under an installment agreement) or involuntarily (through
wage garnishment), the refund due to the custodial parent will be automatically seized to
further reduce the debt. Thus, the custodial parent may end up paying a significant
1

I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (2012).
Robert W. Wood, The Marriage Trap, FORBES, June 27, 2011, at 110, available at
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2011/0627/money-guide-11-tax-joint-return-irs-wedding-marriage-trap.html.
See also TAX POLICY CENTER, RETURN DETAILS BY MARITAL STATUS, 2005–2009, available at
http:/www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/PDF/returns_marital.pdf. The figures were provided in July
2011 by the IRS Statistics of Income Division, which reported that of 140,494,127 returns filed for tax year
2009, 53,570,158 were returns of married persons filing jointly, while 2,539,588 were returns of married
persons filing separately.
3
It is theoretically possible for a married taxpayer to face a lower tax liability by filing separately,
but I have yet to encounter this in practice. For example, if one spouse has significant medical expenses that
exceed 7.5% of his or her own adjusted gross income (AGI) but not the couple’s total AGI, it could benefit
the taxpayer to file separately. However, it is possible that the taxpayer will find him- or herself subject to
the alternative minimum tax, negating the possible tax advantage.
4
This is true for taxpayers at both low and high income levels, though for different reasons. Lowincome taxpayers cannot receive the valuable earned income credit if they choose to file separately, even if
they would be eligible for the credit if they filed jointly. Married middle- and high-income taxpayers (those
individuals with a taxable income of at least $68,650 in 2010) who file separately are subject to a more
progressive income scale than unmarried taxpayers, in that their tax brackets are narrower between rate
increases. For example, a married individual filing separately is subject to income tax at the 33% rate starting
at $104,625. Contrast this to an unmarried individual, who is not subject to the 33% rate until he or she has
taxable income of $171,850. At all income levels, married taxpayers lose the benefit of income splitting if
they choose to file separately. Part IV will examine the disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals
in greater detail with a particular focus on those individuals who are eligible to receive the earned income
credit.
5
I.R.C. § 6402 (2012).
6
To illustrate how sizable a single parent’s refund can be, imagine a divorced mother of three
young children who earns $25,000 as a wage earner. In tax year 2010, assume that the mother files as head
of household, claims the children as dependents, and is eligible for both the earned income credit and the
child tax credit. (These figures disregard the Making Work Pay credit, which would have been available to
her in 2010). She would be due a $6,659 refund even if she had no income tax withheld from her pay in
2010. If the same taxpayer earned only $20,000, she would be due a $7,463 refund.
2
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portion (and in some cases, all) of the joint tax debt, even if the parties had agreed
otherwise under the terms of the divorce.7 This occurs without regard to the parties’
respective income level and ability to pay.8
Consider the story of Wendy Bozick, whose joint liability arose from the
“traditional” model of the one-earner household:9 in 2003, her husband Gary earned
$460,000 from his law practice. Ms. Bozick, who did not perform significant work
outside of the home that year, earned just over $1,000 in 2003. Her husband handled all
finances; Ms. Bozick did not have a bank account and her husband did not allow her to
use a credit card. Her husband gave her cash to buy groceries for the family. He did not
allow her to open the mail. As the filing date for their income taxes approached, Ms.
Bozick worried that her husband might not prepare the return. She filed “married filing
separately” to report her wages, which she thought she was required to do. Ms. Bozick
owed no tax on her separate return due to her low income. When her husband found out,
he became furious, telling her that filing separately rather than jointly would cost the
family $17,000. This is because a one-earner, high-income family enjoys the benefit of
income splitting, which creates a “marriage bonus”10 as compared to a similarly situated
unmarried couple. Recognizing this, her husband had a joint return prepared and had her
sign it without giving her a chance to examine it. The joint return, which was filed in
December 2004, showed the couple had a tax liability of $137,453. Ms. Bozick
petitioned for divorce in July 2005, and Mr. Bozick died in April 2006. Upon his death,
the Service collected a portion of the joint liability from his retirement plan, but a balance
of more than $100,000 remained on the debt. The Service turned its collection efforts on
Ms. Bozick to collect the remainder. By this time, she had joined the work force fulltime, but was earning only eight dollars an hour. She was barely supporting herself and
her children.

7
A divorce agreement has no effect on the Service’s collection of a joint and several liability. The
government defends this practice on the grounds that it is not a party to the divorce and that it would be
impractical for the Service to become involved in divorce settlements. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/T-GGD-98-72, INNOCENT SPOUSE: ALTERNATIVES FOR IMPROVING INNOCENT
SPOUSE RELIEF 10 (1998) (“[P]roviding a legal forum where IRS and the parties to a divorce could resolve
issues relating to both tax matters and divorce proceedings would require a fundamental and extensive
change in either federal tax law or state domestic relations law”). Notwithstanding the Service’s disregard
for the couple’s agreement, one spouse may have a legal right of contribution under the divorce decree.
8
See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY, FY 2001 ANN. REP. TO CONG.
139 [hereinafter TAS REPORT 2001] (showing that when married individuals file a joint return, the primary
spouse usually earns significantly more than the secondary spouse). The table in the report shows that this is
true at all income levels, but is particularly pronounced at the high end and the low end: in the “under
$30,000” income range, 91% of gross income was attributable to the primary spouse; in the “over $100,000”
income range, 79% of income was attributable to the primary spouse. Id. The numbers in the table are from
tax year 1999. Id.
9
All facts are taken from the Tax Court opinion Bozick v. Comm'r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1242 (2010).
This case does not hold special significance and I was not involved with this case in any capacity. I chose
this case because its facts provide a good illustration of the valuable marriage bonus, the ensuing risks of
filing jointly to benefit from that bonus, and the lengthy process for seeking relief from joint liability.
10
A marriage bonus results when a married couple enjoys tax savings by virtue of the joint filing
rates. The bonus is most pronounced when one spouse earns a high income and the other has little to no
income. The opposite phenomenon is called the “marriage penalty,” which occurs when two spouses earn
significant and roughly equal incomes; they pay more income tax than they would in the aggregate if they
were unmarried. These concepts are discussed further in Part I.A. See also infra note 54.
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In February 2007, Ms. Bozick filed a request for “innocent spouse relief,”11 but
the Service denied her claim in July of that year, stating, among other reasons, that she
failed to show that it would be unfair to hold her jointly liable. In accordance with her
rights of judicial review, Ms. Bozick petitioned the United States Tax Court in October
2007 and told her story again at her March 2009 trial. On March 30, 2010, more than
three years after her initial request for relief, the court filed its opinion in her favor and
relieved her of this joint income tax liability.12
This article will examine the problems and inefficiencies that arise from joint and
several liability and the innocent spouse relief process. In particular, I will examine the
peculiar conundrum faced by low-income taxpayers.13 Unlike the Bozick family, which
received a sizable economic benefit by virtue of the joint filing status, a low-income
couple generally will receive only a nominal “marriage bonus” attributable to income
splitting. As I will explain, married low-income taxpayers face a conundrum because
they cannot receive the earned income credit unless they file a joint return, subjecting
themselves to joint and several liability.14 Meanwhile, if the married couple does file
jointly, there is no economic advantage as compared to a similarly situated unmarried and
cohabiting couple; in fact, the unmarried couple will typically receive a larger aggregate
refund.15
The article will focus on the three reasons I believe the joint filing status should
be eliminated and all taxpayers should file as individuals: (1) the rationales for joint filing
are less applicable than they once were; (2) Congressional attempts to address inequities
through innocent spouse relief are a well-intended but fundamentally inefficient solution;
and (3) it is necessary to reconsider the policy of retaining the “married” filing statuses in
light of the ways in which family structures, society, and the Code have evolved since
joint and several liability was enacted in 1938. Congress should reform the current
filing-status structures through a lens of simplicity and demographic reality.
The article proceeds from here in four parts. Part II will provide a brief historical
context: why and how the U.S. tax system provides different rules and rates for married
taxpayers, and the original reasons for imposing joint and several liability on joint
returns. Within that context, I will discuss why the traditional rationales underpinning
joint and several liability are less convincing today. This is particularly true for lowincome taxpayers, as I will discuss.

11
Congress first enacted innocent spouse relief in 1971 and has expanded the provisions and the
scope of relief repeatedly over time. Currently there are three types of relief provided in I.R.C. § 6015. Part
II provides a detailed history of innocent spouse relief.
12
As I discuss elsewhere, the process for obtaining relief is typically lengthy and often involves an
administrative or judicial appeal. In this case, I should note that the IRS denial came quickly and the three
year period was attributable in part to Ms. Bozick having been granted a continuance for her trial date in
order to obtain counsel.
13
By “low-income taxpayers” I refer to those taxpayers who are income-eligible to receive the
earned income credit. In 2010, a married couple with income up to $48,362 could receive the earned income
credit, so long as they filed jointly and had at least three qualifying children. The income limits are lower for
couples with fewer or no children.
14
Section 7703(b) provides an exception for certain married individuals living apart from a spouse
during the last six months of the taxable year and maintaining a household with a child; an individual meeting
the requirements of § 7703(b) is not considered married and thus remains eligible for the earned income
credit because he or she is permitted to file as “head of household” rather than “married filing separately.”
15
See infra Part IV.B.
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Part III will present a detailed overview of the procedures for innocent spouse
relief. The innocent spouse relief process is time-consuming, inefficient, and results in
inconsistent outcomes. It is not uncommon for a taxpayer to spend several years and
untold resources trying to obtain the legal relief he or she seeks.16 The majority of initial
requests for innocent spouse relief are denied,17 meaning the taxpayer must pursue an
administrative appeal and often judicial review of the claim. In recent years the process
has become ever more liberalized, broadening the grounds for relief and the scope of
judicial review if relief is denied. In 1998, when Congress enacted § 6015(f),18 more
taxpayers became eligible for relief and the number of claims increased. Since that time,
the Service has regularly received up to fifty thousand requests for innocent spouse relief
a year, and it grants fewer than half of them.19 Taxpayers are statutorily entitled to
petition the Tax Court if the Service denies the request for relief; innocent spouse appeals
are consistently among the ten most litigated tax issues in federal court each year.20 The
facts set out in the Tax Court’s opinion in Bozick certainly weighed in her favor and
portrayed her in a sympathetic light. Yet it took her three years to obtain relief. Her
administrative request was denied, and one presumes that the IRS was unwilling or
unable to settle the case in her favor after she filed her Tax Court petition.21 Over the
course of three years, imagine how many hours of work must have been devoted to this
file: by the IRS Innocent Spouse Unit, the Tax Court, and Ms. Bozick and her attorney.
During that time, Ms. Bozick endured financial hardship and struggled to raise her
children. While I agree with the Tax Court’s finding in this specific case and support the
Congressional intent of the innocent spouse provisions generally, I maintain that the
process is burdensome to taxpayers and is an inefficient use of administrative and judicial

16
See TAS REPORT 2001, supra note 8, at 134 ("Given the many steps and legal requirements in the
process, even the best case scenario requires 304 days to process a claim for relief under IRC § 6015.").
17
See id. at 128 (stating that the IRS rejects 49% of claims for not meeting requirements for
consideration and only 47.7% of the remaining claims obtain any relief). See also NAT’L TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE, ANOTHER MARRIAGE PENALTY—TAXING THE WRONG SPOUSE, FY 2005 ANN. REP TO CONG. 423
(2005) [hereinafter TAS REPORT 2005] (citing a 2005 IRS report that found innocent spouse relief was
granted at the administrative level “on only about 30 percent of all claims”).
18
References to a statute section are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, unless
otherwise indicated.
19
In many recent years, the Service has reported receiving more than fifty thousand requests for
innocent spouse relief. See, e.g., Nicola M. White, Lawmakers Urge IRS to Review Innocent Spouse Relief
Regulations, 131 TAX NOTES TODAY 358 (2011); Laura Saunders, A New Push to Protect Spouses, WALL ST.
J., May 28, 2011, at 9-B.9. A significant number of these requests are immediately rejected for not meeting
threshold criteria. Of the remaining requests, the relief rate is still low. See, e.g., Carla Fried, For ‘Innocent
Spouses,’ a Helpful Shift in I.R.S. Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at 11-BU.11 (stating that “22 percent of
the 32,000 cases filed each year that qualify for review are granted full relief”).
20
See I.R.C. § 7803(c)(2)(B)(ii)(X) (2012) (mandating that the National Taxpayer Advocate report
to Congress annually on the “10 most litigated issues for each category of taxpayers”). Innocent spouse relief
has appeared on this “top ten” list every year since 2004. See e.g., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, THE MOST
LITIGATED ISSUES, FY 2011 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 589 (2011) [hereinafter TAS REPORT 2011] (listing relief
from joint and several liability as the eighth most litigated issue from June 1, 2010, to May 31, 2011). The
list includes only those cases for which an opinion is issued; since 2007, more than seventy-five percent of
docketed Tax Court cases are settled each year, and fewer than three percent of docketed cases resulted in
trial and decision. Id. at 591. Thus, the vast majority of docketed cases are therefore not reflected in these
annual lists.
21
Once a petition is filed with the Tax Court, cases are automatically sent to an IRS Appeals office,
which concentrates on attempting to settle cases prior to trial. That Ms. Bozick's trial went forward indicates
that the parties were unable to do so. More than seventy-five percent of Tax Court cases are settled outside
of court. Supra note 20.
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resources. Moving to an individual filing system would eliminate the need for innocent
spouse relief, allowing those resources to be devoted elsewhere.
Part IV examines some of the solutions previously proposed to address the
shortcomings of the innocent spouse relief framework. A chorus of scholars, professional
associations, and the National Taxpayer Advocate has recommended one solution in
particular—to eliminate joint and several liability for joint filers.22 This solution would
address the first two of my concerns; importantly, it would render the innocent spouse
relief process unnecessary, because each spouse would only be liable for tax arising from
his or her proportionate income. At the direction of Congress, the Department of
Treasury studied this and other proposals in 1998 and issued a comprehensive report of
its findings. The report concluded that there were sound policy and practical reasons to
retain joint filing and joint and several liability for married couples. Instead of adopting
the proposals to eliminate joint and several liability, the report recommended modifying
the Code to accommodate more cases by expanding the grounds for innocent spouse
relief.23 Congress followed this recommendation, greatly broadening the circumstances
under which a joint filer can later apply for relief. As a result, since 1998 there has been
a drastic rise in the number of innocent spouse relief claims filed and a corresponding
increase in the amount of resources devoted to innocent spouse claims. Part IV examines
the reasons the Treasury Department did not believe it was appropriate to replace or
reform the joint and several liability standard; with the benefit of hindsight, I evaluate
those arguments.
While I believe eliminating joint liability would have been a positive solution, I
discuss in Part V why I believe Congress should go even further: it should eliminate joint
filing altogether and require all taxpayers to file an individual return of their own
income.24 Part V will elaborate on the third of the concerns I outlined above, namely,
that the Code does not properly reflect the demographic reality of twenty-first century
America. Today there are many more accepted versions of what constitutes a
“household” or “family unit” than there were in the mid-twentieth century, making the
“married filing jointly” status an antiquated concept. Marital status should not be used as
a proxy for household composition because this does not match the reality. There are
many reasons why it is time for the Code to shift away from a system that assumes and
favors a married couple with only one spouse in the labor force: the rise of divorced
22

In the 1990s, the recommenders included the American Bar Association, the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, and other academic commentators. TAS REPORT 2005, supra note 17, at
409 n.13; see also DEP’T. OF THE TREAS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON JOINT LIABILITY AND INNOCENT
SPOUSE ISSUES 34–41 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 TREAS. REPORT ON JL AND IS], available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/innospos.pdf.
23
Id. at 57–58.
24
This article will focus primarily on the concerns of low-income taxpayers, but numerous scholars
have argued for mandatory individual filing on a variety of policy grounds. See, e.g., Lily Kahng, One is the
Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651, 684 (2010) (arguing
that the joint return should be abolished because it penalizes single people). See also James Puckett,
Rethinking Tax Priorities: Marriage Neutrality, Children, and Contemporary Families, 78 U. CIN. L. REV.
1409, 1434 (2010) (arguing that “[t]he joint return (and special rates for married taxpayers) should be
abolished as an incoherent penalty and subsidy of marriage”); EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 19–
23 (1997) (advocating individual filing as more beneficial for women); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the
Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339 (1994) (concluding that mandatory separate returns present the best
option among imperfect neutralities); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income
Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 108 (1993) (arguing that individual tax
returns would be more equitable).
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individuals and single-parent households; the rise in the number of two-earner
households; the significant increase in the number of couples who live together in a
household but do not wed; and the unavailability of this filing status for individuals in
same-sex partnerships or marriage.
My argument—that demographic trends matter—will focus in particular on lowincome taxpayers. It examines how the value of the earned income credit, a refundable
credit primarily benefiting parents that was not added to the Code until several decades
after the joint filing status was introduced, has changed the stakes for low-income
taxpayers when deciding upon a filing status. Married taxpayers must accept the risks of
joint and several liability or else sacrifice eligibility for the refundable earned income
credit; choosing the latter may mean the taxpayers forsake thousands of dollars to help
support their household.
If the couple files jointly and a deficiency is later determined, it is true that the
spouse who did not earn the income or claim the deduction causing the unpaid tax can
file an innocent spouse request for relief from joint liability. In fact, low-income
taxpayers (as Ms. Bozick was at the time she filed) are especially likely to file for such
relief. Taxpayers who request innocent spouse relief are disproportionately low-income
women who are unmarried; often they are struggling to maintain a home for children.25
Most often, it is the ex-wife who requests innocent spouse relief, and she constitutes the
lower-earning half of the divorced couple.26 Low-income taxpayers qualify for pro bono
legal representation in their innocent spouse claims,27 presuming that they know to
inquire about such relief and have the time to work with counsel in pursuing it. But it is
certainly not an easy, pleasant, or quick process to endure, and there is a high likelihood
the taxpayer will not prevail.28
Meanwhile, unmarried couples raising children together, a demographic group
that has increased at a dramatic rate since 1960,29 do not face a filing dilemma that might
result in having to apply for relief from joint liability. Those low-income divorcées who
have endured the innocent spouse relief request process may find it especially galling to
learn that an unmarried couple, in fact, can receive a higher overall earned income credit
than a married couple with an identical household income.
25

TAS REPORT 2005, supra note 17, at 422 (citing data from tax year 2001). For this statistical
reason, I refer to the requesting spouse in the feminine or focus my arguments on women in particular. This
is not to suggest that men do not file or succeed with claims for innocent spouse relief; in fact, in one of my
first innocent spouse cases I represented an ex-husband who was granted relief at the administrative appeal
level.
26
Most innocent spouse claims are filed by the lower-earning spouse, which is usually the woman.
TAS REPORT 2001, supra note 8, at 132. “Nearly 90% of the claims filed for relief from Joint and Several
Liability are filed by women with earned income that is approximately 25% of the total income on a joint
return.” Id. at 128.
27
Congress funds a Low-Income Taxpayer Clinic (LITC) program administered by the Taxpayer
Advocate Service. This program, which was established in 1998 with the addition of I.R.C. § 7526, provides
federal matching grants to non-profit organizations that provide legal representation to income-eligible
taxpayers who have a controversy with the Internal Revenue Service. I direct the LITC program at
Washington and Lee University School of Law, and this article is inspired in large part by my experiences
working with these clients.
28
Supra note 17.
29
See THE NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS: THE SOCIAL HEALTH OF
MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 29 (2003) (charting the 850% increase of unmarried, cohabiting, adult couples living
with one or more children under age 15 from the 1960s to 2000; the figure increased from 197,000 in 1960 to
1.675 million in 2000).
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It would be far more beneficial to married low-income taxpayers if Congress
were to amend the Code so as not to condition the earned income tax credit (or any form
of perceived “marriage bonus”) on joint filing. Congress can address this conundrum and
today’s complex demographic reality without adding further complexity to the Code.
Congress should respond to the calls for a simpler and more coherent Code by reducing
the number of individual filing statuses from four to two, ignoring marital status while
retaining a distinction in the treatment of taxpayers with and without children.
II.
HOW DID WE GET HERE? (HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF JOINT FILING
STATUS)
Much has been written about the history of joint filing and the rationale behind
joint and several liability.30 In order to appreciate the shortcomings and drawbacks of
joint and several liability, it is important to first consider why the current system is as it
is.
A.
Shared Risks: Tracing the History of Joint and Several Liability
Joint and several liability for married taxpayers has been the settled rule of the
Code since 1938, but it was not always the rule. Early revenue laws enacted in 191331
and 191632 imposed taxation on individuals. In 1918, married taxpayers were permitted
to file a joint return and could aggregate their income as well as their losses and
deductions, but the Code left open the question of how to allocate the liability between
spouses.33
The idea of joint and several liability originated not with Congress, but in an
internal office decision known as I.T. 1575, which was published by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue in 1923.34 Even after the Supreme Court held otherwise,35 the
Commissioner took the position that this type of office decision—published by the
Income Tax Unit of the Bureau with a cautionary note that they “have none of the force
or effect of Treasury Decisions and do not commit the Department to any interpretation
of the law”—evinced the intent of Congress if the underlying revenue acts were
reenacted without change.36 Thus, even though the Code was silent on the issue, in
litigation the Commissioner repeatedly advanced the position that joint and several
liability was “settled administrative practice.”37
In Cole v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
question of joint liability on joint returns and ruled that “spouses are not jointly and
30

For a detailed history of joint and several liability, see 1998 TREAS. REPORT ON JL AND IS, supra
note 22. See also Richard C. E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and Several Liability for Income
Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV. 317 (1990) (providing a detailed history of the origins of the
joint return, Cole, and the subsequent introduction of joint liability); Bryan T. Camp, The Unhappy Marriage
of Law and Equity in Joint Return Liability, 108 TAX NOTES 1307 (2005).
31
Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, ch. 16, § II (A)(1), 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913).
32
Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, ch. 463, § 1(a), 39 Stat. 756 (1916).
33
See Beck, supra note 30, at 335; see also TAS REPORT 2001, supra note 8, at 132. Separate rate
brackets for joint returns were not introduced until 1948.
34
I.T. 1575, 1923-1 C.B. 144 (1923) (“[W]here a husband and wife filed a joint return they are
individually liable for the full amount of tax shown to be due on such return.”).
35
Helvering v. N.Y. Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455 (1934).
36
See Cole v. Comm'r, 81 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir. 1935) (noting the conflict between the
Commissioner's arguments and the cautionary notice in the bulletin).
37
Id. (citing Helvering, 292 U.S. at 467–68). See also Comm'r v. Rabenold, 108 F.2d 639, 641 (2d
Cir. 1940) (“[O]nly by implication can such a liability be found in the 1932 Act, and taxing laws are not to be
extended by implication.”).
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severally liable for a deficiency arising entirely out of the separate income of one of
them.”38 Louis and Frida Cole filed a joint income tax return for 1929. At that time, a
husband and wife could choose to include their respective incomes on a joint return and
be subject to tax on the aggregate income; deductions and credits to which either were
entitled would be taken from the aggregate income. After the Coles filed their joint
return, the Service determined a deficiency in the amount of $27,568. The petitioner,
who was the executrix of Mr. Cole’s estate, argued the husband and wife were each
“liable only for the proportion of the tax attributable to his share of the aggregate
income.”39 The Commissioner, following the Bureau’s administrative practice of
imposing joint and several liability as set out in I.T. 1575, argued that it was “impossible”
for the Service to prorate the liability because the liability had been calculated on their
The Board of Tax Appeals had previously rejected the
combined income.40
Commissioner’s argument that a husband and wife filing jointly became “a single taxing
entity, and as such, ‘the taxpayer.’”41 The Commissioner, in his brief in Cole, set forth
the position that “the husband and wife, must of course, accept this unusual privilege of
reducing their taxes as it exists with all of its necessary concomitant conditions and
results.”42 The Ninth Circuit did not agree with the Commissioner, finding that any
administrative difficulties of apportioning the liability could be overcome; the court
pointed out that, in this case, the apportioned liabilities had in fact been stipulated.
Despite the outcome in Cole, the Commissioner subsequently persisted in
arguing that joint and several liability must attach to a joint filing, as a matter of
administrative convenience.43 With the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1938
(hereinafter “1938 Act”), the Service finally got its wish: Congress added subsection
51(b), which stated “the liability with respect to the tax shall be joint and several.”44
After the 1938 Act, the Commissioner then began arguing in ongoing litigation involving
tax years prior to the effective date of the 1938 Act that § 51 “should be deemed merely
declaratory of existing law under prior revenue acts.”45
In Cole, the Commissioner noted the taxpayers reduced their taxes by filing
jointly, with the tax being computed on their aggregate income. At the time of Cole, joint
filing produced a reduction in tax only when one spouse had deductions (including
losses) or credits that could offset the income of the other. Unlike our present system, in
which there are five separate filing statuses and four accompanying rate structures, the
tax rates prior to 1948 were uniform for all types of returns. Thus, for many married
38

Cole, 81 F.2d. at 489.
Id. at 486.
40
Id. at 490.
41
Id. (citing Gummey v. Comm’r, 26 B.T.A. 894, 895–96 (1932)).
42
Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
43
See, e.g., Uniacke v. Comm'r, 132 F.2d 781, 783 (2d Cir. 1942) (ruling that joint and several
liability did not attach). In a case involving tax year 1936, the court stated: “The argument based on
administrative convenience does not impress us . . . . The administrative difficulties resulting from rejecting
the Commissioner's construction of the statute would seem to be somewhat exaggerated in the argument.”
See also Estate of Hague v. Comm'r, 45 B.T.A. 104, 113 (1941) (in which the Commissioner argued for joint
and several liability for a couple where the income in question was solely the husband’s); Rabenold, 108 F.2d
at 640.
44
Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No 75-554, ch. 289, § 51(b), 52 Stat. 447, 476 (1938). The
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, retains the same language in § 6013(d)(3): “if a joint return is
made, the tax shall be computed on the aggregate income and the liability with respect to the tax shall be joint
and several.”
45
Rabenold, 108 F.2d at 640.
39
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couples, the effect of aggregating income was to push the couple into a higher tax
bracket, resulting in a higher liability than if the couple had filed as two individuals.46 A
couple would not benefit from joint filing unless one spouse had deductions or credits
that could offset the income of the other spouse.
In unpacking the rationales of joint and several liability, it is important to
recognize that the reduction and ensuing “unusual privilege” referred to by the
Commissioner in Cole should not be confused with so-called “income splitting,” which
was not a benefit of joint filing until the Revenue Act of 1948 created a separate rate
Somewhat ironically, income splitting was a
structure for married couples.47
phenomenon that was first enjoyed by married couples who filed separate returns in
community property states. Under the theory that income earned by one spouse was
community property of the other spouse, in 1930 the Supreme Court ruled in Poe v.
Seaborn that spouses were permitted to file separately and each treat one half of the
spouses’ community property income as his or her income for tax purposes.48 Thus, if
the husband earned $10,000, and the wife did not have any income, each would file a
separate return reporting $5,000 of income. Joint and several liability did not attach,
because the spouses filed separately.49 Yet due to the nature of the progressive rate
structure, the taxpayers benefitted from the lower rates applicable to the lower income
amounts.
For a time following Seaborn, only taxpayers who lived in community property
states enjoyed the benefits of income splitting because each individual was subject to tax
on one-half of the couple’s total income. At the same time, taxpayers in common law
states who filed a joint return had to aggregate their income, but were subject to tax under
the same “steeply progressive” rate structure.50 Congress was concerned when a number
of states, concerned about the unequal tax treatment of their residents, moved to adopt the
community property system.51 To address this disparity, the Revenue Act of 1948
introduced a new rate schedule for married taxpayers filing a joint return.52
So while Congress established joint and several liability for married filers in
1938, it was not until ten years later, in 1948, when the new separate rate schedules were
46

See Grant v. Rose, 24 F.2d 115, 118–19 (N.D. Ga. 1928) (summarizing these advantages and
disadvantages), aff'd, 39 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1930).
47
Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, ch. 168, § 301, 62 Stat. 110, 114 (1948).
48
Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 118 (1930).
49
State laws in community property states vary as to whether the interests of each spouse are
subject to lien or levy by the Service. In at least some community property states, the Service can collect the
separate tax liability of one spouse from the other spouse’s community income. See 1998 TREAS. REPORT ON
JL AND IS, supra note 22. In 1980, Congress enacted § 66 to provide limited relief to taxpayers in
community property states. Section 66, while important to those who live in community property states, is
outside the scope of this article.
50
See S. REP. NO. 80-1013, at 22 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163, 1184 (describing
the existing law: “Since the rates applied under the income tax are steeply progressive, the same family
income divided in two halves by community property law will be taxed far less severely than in a commonlaw State where the whole income is apt to be taxed to one spouse.”).
51
Id., at 24–25. The legislative history gives another interesting reason for adopting income
splitting in the Code: “The incentive for married couples in common-law states to attempt the reduction of
their taxes by the division of their income through such devices as trusts, joint tenancies, and family
partnerships will be reduced materially. Administrative difficulties stemming from the use of such devices
will be diminished, and there will be less need for meticulous legislation on the income-tax treatment of trusts
and family partnerships.”
52
Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, ch. 168, § 301, 26 U.S.C. §12, 62 Stat. 110, 114
(1948).
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introduced, that most taxpayers had an economic incentive to file a joint return.53
Significantly, the new rate schedules benefitted all married taxpayers versus their
unmarried peers, because at that time the brackets were exactly twice as wide as the rate
schedule for unmarried taxpayers.
As a result of this structure, a married couple was not worse off in 1948 under the
married filing jointly rates than under the individual rates. One spouse’s deductions
could be used to offset the income of the other (as in Cole), without the couple facing
higher rates (as they had prior to the Revenue Act of 1948). The benefits of income
splitting enjoyed by married couples were especially favorable when one spouse (at that
time, almost certainly the husband) worked and the other spouse did not. This
phenomenon became known as the “marriage bonus.”54
Over time, Congress recognized that the pendulum had swung too far in favor of
married couples. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 created a new, lower rate schedule for
unmarried persons to correct the fact that, due to income splitting, an unmarried person’s
tax was as much as forty-two percent higher than the tax paid by a married couple filing
jointly reporting the same total income as the unmarried person.55 The Joint Committee
on Taxation explained in its report accompanying the Act:
With the new rate schedule for single persons, married couples filing a
joint return will pay more tax than two single persons with the same total
income. This is a necessary result of changing the income-splitting
relationship between single and joint returns. Moreover, it is justified on
the grounds that although a married couple has greater living expenses
than a single person and hence should pay less tax, the couple’s living
expenses are likely to be less than those of two single persons and
therefore the couple’s tax should be higher than that of two single
persons.56
With that rationale underlying the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the “marriage
penalty” was born. However, Congress did not reconsider the fairness of joint and
several liability—if the “privilege” of income splitting was now eroded for many couples,
should a spouse still be held liable for the other’s tax liability?57 Significantly, Congress
53

See Beck, supra note 30, at 337 n.78 (citing legislative history showing that, in 1938, when it
was rarely the case that a couple would benefit economically by filing jointly, ninety-four percent of married
couples filed a joint return) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 1040, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. at 16-17 (1941), reprinted in
1941-2 C.B. 413, 426-27). Beck points out that federal income tax rates were low enough in 1938 that it
made no difference in most people's tax rates whether they filed jointly or separately; he posits that most of
these couples filed jointly for the sake of the convenience of filling out one form rather than two, rather than
to achieve tax savings.
54
For a historical examination of marriage bonuses and penalties, see Lawrence Zelenak, Doing
Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1 (2000). Zelenak notes
that while the 1948 legislation achieved couples neutrality, its purpose was “a delayed response to geographic
discrimination between husbands in separate property states and those in community property states.” Id. at
4. Zelenak notes, as others have, that the goals of progressivity, couples neutrality, and marriage neutrality
are incompatible. In both this article and in his article entitled Marriage and the Income Tax, supra note 24,
Zelenak states his preference for mandatory separate filing.
55
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99th CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF 1969 TAX REFORM
ACT 222 (Joint Comm. Print 1970).
56
Id. at 223.
57
In his 1990 article, Beck said the following about the introduction of the marriage penalty in the
Tax Reform Act of 1969: “The argument that income splitting justifies joint return liability seems hollow for
that forty percent of married couples who suffer the marriage penalty. While they may be better off filing
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seems to envision two types of households in its thinking—that of an unmarried single
person, and that of a married couple.
What about an unmarried couple living together, sharing household expenses, or
any number of nontraditional household units?58 Demographically, the number of those
households may have been statistically less significant in 1969, but today this is not the
case. The rate of cohabitation in the United States is fourteen times higher in 2010 than it
was in 1970, and approximately twenty-four percent of children are born to cohabiting
couples.59 The legislative intent of certain Code provisions thus seems antiquated when
viewed in light of the nation’s changed demographics.
B.
Examining the Stated Rationales of Joint and Several Liability: Does the
Intent Still Make Sense in Twenty-First Century America?
1.
Administrative Ease for Taxpayers and Government
Dating back to the Commissioner’s briefs in Cole and continuing today,
administrative ease has been an oft-cited rationale in support of both joint return filing
and joint and several liability.60 The legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1938,
picking up on the arguments made by the Commissioner in Cole and earlier cases, stated:
Unless the husband and wife are to be held jointly and severally liable
for the tax upon their aggregate net income, it will be necessary for the
[IRS] to require that their individual incomes and deductions shall be
separately stated in the return, in order that their respective income-tax
liability may be separately determined. Such a requirement would cause
considerable hardship upon taxpayers with moderate incomes and would
largely eliminate the advantages of the joint return.61
It is true that if the married filing jointly status were eliminated, there would be a
sharp increase in the number of returns that the Service must process. It is also true that
would create an added burden for married taxpayers, who must prepare, or pay for the
preparation of, two individual returns rather than one joint return.62
However, technology has come quite a long way since 1938. The Service does
not process returns by hand, nor do most taxpayers prepare a return with pencil and
paper. Since 1986, the Service has encouraged (and, more recently, mandated in some
cases) the electronic filing of income tax returns. These efforts are working. In June of
jointly than filing separately, they would be still better off if they had never married, or were divorced. From
this vantage point, filing jointly, as ninety-nine percent of married persons do, involves an overall tax
detriment, rather than a benefit. If joint return liability were justified on a quid pro quo theory, the liability
probably should have been abolished in 1969, when the marriage penalty arose.” Beck, supra note 30, at
372.
58
I conclude it is appropriate to reconsider the current structures in light of other code provisions
and changing demographics. See infra Part IV.
59
THE NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, Executive Summary to WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: THIRTY
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 1 (3d ed. 2011), available at
http://www.americanvalues.org/pdfs/dl.php?name=wmm3es.
60
The Treasury Department invoked this rationale in its 1998 report eschewing separate filing in
favor of expanded innocent spouse reform. See infra Part III. But see Comm'r v. Uniacke, 132 F.2d 781, 783
(2d Cir. 1942) (dismissing the rationale of administrative convenience); Comm'r v. Rabenold, 108 F.2d 639,
640 (2d Cir. 1940) (recognizing the administrative inconvenience of apportioning tax deficiencies between
husband and wife). Both cases were decided under pre-1938 law.
61
1998 TREAS. REPORT ON JL AND IS, supra note 22, at 6–7 (citing H.R. 1860, 75th Cong. 2d Sess.,
1939-1 C.B. 749) (emphasis added).
62
Id. at 25–27.
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2011, the Service announced that it has processed more than one billion total individual
tax returns through its electronic filing program. This statistic included more than 100
million individual tax returns (representing 79% of individual income tax returns filed)
that were e-filed during the 2011 filing season.63 Contrast this with tax year 1998, in
which only 19% (25 million out of 123 million) of all individual income tax returns were
e-filed.64
In her 2005 Annual Report to Congress, Nina Olson recommended that Congress
eliminate joint and several liability and instead require married taxpayers to file a splitcolumn tax return.65 She noted that Congress had cited “administrative” reasons when it
imposed joint liability in 1938, and that administrative challenges had again been cited as
a hurdle by the Treasury Department in its 1998 study.66 Her 2005 report described
updates to the Service’s computer system and the rise of e-filing as two reasons that those
administrative challenges were less significant in 2005 than they were even in 1998.67
She further suggested that, to the extent these administrative challenges remain, they
“could also be partially offset by the reduction in, or elimination of, innocent spouse
relief” and several other related issues that arise from joint filing.68
One issue of concern is that the trend towards e-filing, however positive for the
Service, creates a new difficulty in the joint and several liability context because an
actual signature is not required on an electronically filed return.69 This facilitates the
ability of one spouse to enter the tax information and file the return without the other
spouse ever having the opportunity to review or sign the return. Similarly, a spouse who
reviews and approves a joint return would not know if the other spouse makes subsequent
changes prior to filing it. Given the structural incentives to file jointly, I believe there
will be an increase in this type of “forgery” as e-filing becomes the norm. If the other
spouse objects to the filing, the Service must undergo a factual determination as to
whether the filing spouse forged a signature or merely acted with tacit consent based on
past practice within the marriage.70 This is another example of how joint liability creates
an additional burden on Service resources.
The rise of e-filing thus provides two important reasons in support of Congress
eliminating joint filing: (1) in light of this technological advance, “administrative ease” is
no longer a convincing rationale in support of joint return; and (2) it can be very difficult
to ensure that both spouses reviewed and consented to a joint return that is filed
electronically.
63

INTERNAL REV. SERV., ONE BILLION SERVED: IRS E-FILE PASSES MAJOR MILESTONE, IR-2011-64
(June 9, 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/One-Billion-Served:-IRS-E-File-Passes-Major-Milestone.
64
Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, Key Legislative Recommendation: Another Marriage Penalty - Taxing
the Wrong Spouse, 2005 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 426 (citing IRS Pub. 55B, Data Book (Mar. 1998) (Tables 3 and
4)).
65
Id. at 408–09.
66
See infra Part III.
67
Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 64, at 425–26.
68
Id. at 426. Olson mentions community property relief, injured spouse relief, and “numerous
other IRC provisions that override community property rules in an ad hoc fashion.” Id. at 426. While
outside the scope of this article, each of these issues exists because of joint and several liability.
69
INTERNAL REV. SERV., TAXPAYERS WHO FILE ELECTRONICALLY MUST USE E-SIGNATURES, FS2011-07 (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/fs-11-07.pdf.
70
I.R.M. § 25.15.1.2.4 (Mar. 4, 2011) available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-015001.html#d0e231 (providing guidance to Service employees as to the conditions under which a joint return is
invalid). These questions are technically outside of innocent spouse relief, because § 6015 relief is only
available when the requesting spouse has signed a joint income tax return.

2012]

DECOUPLING TAXES AND MARRIAGE 109

2.
Joint Liability as the Price for the “Privilege” of Filing Jointly
The “privilege” of filing a joint return is frequently invoked as a justification in
support of joint and several liability. Interestingly, the use of the word precedes the
introduction of income splitting and the concept of the marriage bonus. It dates back at
least to Cole, when the Commissioner spoke of the “‘unusual privilege’ of filing a joint
return.”71 The legislative history accompanying the Revenue Act of 1938 echoed the
Commissioner’s use of the word “privilege”:
Section 51(b) of the bill expressly provides that the spouses, who
exercise the privilege of filing a joint return, are jointly and severally
liable for the tax computed upon their aggregate income. It is necessary,
for administrative reasons, that any doubt as to the existence of such
liability should be set at rest, if the privilege of filing such joint returns is
continued.72
Courts emphasized this “privilege” after Congress first introduced innocent
spouse relief in 1971. In its oft-cited Sonnenborn opinion released that same year, the
Tax Court wrote of the privilege as a fact that must be kept in mind when weighing
innocent spouse relief:
It is important that these provisions be kept in proper perspective. The
filing of a joint return is a highly valuable privilege to husband and wife
since the resulting tax liability is generally substantially less than the
combined taxes that would be due from both spouses if they had filed
separate returns. This circumstance gives particular emphasis to the
statutory rule that liability with respect to tax is joint and several,
regardless of the source of the income or of the fact that one spouse may
be far less informed about the contents of the return than the other, for
both spouses ordinarily benefit from the reduction in tax that ensues by
reason of the joint return . . . . [I]t must be kept in mind that Congress
still regards joint and several liability as an important adjunct to the
privilege of filing joint returns, and that if there is to be any relaxation of
that rule the taxpayer must comply with the carefully detailed conditions
set forth in section 6013(e).73
These words, written more than forty years ago, have been cited with
frequency.74 As discussed in Part III, the innocent spouse provisions have changed
considerably since 1971. But that is not all that has changed, in the Code or in society
generally. If a “price”75 is to be paid by taxpayers for this “privilege,” we must consider
to what extent and for whom joint filing remains a privilege today.
71

Cole v. Comm'r, 81 F.2d 485, 487 (9th Cir. 1935).
H.R. Rep. No. 1860, at 29–30 (1938).
73
Sonnenborn v. Comm’r, 57 T.C. 373, 380–81 (1971) (discussing why the innocent spouse
provisions must be narrowly construed) (emphasis added). Section 6013(e) was the innocent spouse
provision in effect at the time. As the opinion notes in footnote 3, the innocent spouse provision became law
on January 12, 1971, but by virtue of its enacting legislation the relief was applicable to all taxable years to
which the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 applied.
74
See, e.g., Ogonoski v. Comm’r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1038; Crowley v. Comm’r, 70 T.C.M. (CCH)
1374; Prince v. Comm’r, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 309; Murphy v. Comm’r, 103 T.C. 111 (1994).
75
Sonnenborn did not use the term “price” with respect to the privilege, but subsequent courts
citing Sonnenborn for this principle have used this term. See, e.g., Stevens v. Comm’r, 872 F.2d 1499, 1503
(11th Cir. 1989) (“The rate of tax applied against a given amount of income generally is lower when the
72
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In the intervening six decades since income splitting was introduced, two major
changes to the Code have occurred that erode the “unusual privilege” argument: (1) the
introduction of the marriage penalty; and (2) the introduction of the earned income credit.
Changing demographics exacerbate the effects of these changes to the Code. If the
privilege represents the reduction in tax achieved by joint filing, then it is only a privilege
to the extent that such reduction can be accomplished. The so-called “privilege” of filing
jointly has no actual value to many married taxpayers versus similarly situated taxpayers
who are unmarried and file as single. While the joint filing status may be a “highly
valuable privilege” for some, it is certainly not the case for all taxpayers.
Income splitting is one phenomenon that results in reduction of tax, and is most
pronounced in cases where one spouse earns a high income and the other does not work.
However, a couple in which both spouses earn a high income is likely to face not a
marriage bonus but a marriage penalty; in these cases, the spouses would owe a smaller
aggregate tax liability if they were permitted to file as unmarried individuals. Arguably,
there is no “privilege” for two high-earners who must file as married, yet they are held
jointly and severally liable for filing jointly.76
A low-income couple faces a similarly illogical conundrum: their benefit from
income splitting is likely nominal as compared to a one-earner high income couple such
as the Bozicks, but they must accept joint and several liability as a condition of receiving
the earned income credit. At the same time, a similarly situated unmarried couple would
receive a higher aggregate refund than the married couple. Joint filing cannot be said to
be a “highly valuable privilege” if the resulting refund is less favorable. Part V explores
this conundrum in greater detail.
III.
RELIEF IS AVAILABLE TO SOME INNOCENT SPOUSES, BUT AT WHAT
COST TO THE SYSTEM?
The process affording relief to innocent spouses has become increasingly
liberalized over the past forty years, allowing a requesting spouse broader grounds for
relief and appeal. This is well intended; if there is to be a system for relief, it should be a
comprehensive process that seeks the most equitable outcome. But as we consider the
state of the relief process today, let us also flip the “highly valuable privilege” theory of
joint liability on its head.
Considerable resources are devoted to the resolution of these highly factual “hesaid, she-said” marital disputes each year. Are these costs really worth the benefits of
joint and several liability to the government? In other words, would the Service be better
off if Congress repealed § 6013(d)(3) and adopted a system of separate rather than joint
liability for spouses? Given the divorce rate, among other factors, would it not be easier

income is reported on a joint return than when a husband and wife file separate returns. The price which the
law exacts for this privilege is that taxpayers who file a joint return are jointly and severally liable for the
amount of tax due, regardless of the source of income reported and notwithstanding the fact that one spouse
may be less informed about the contents of the return.”) (citation omitted), aff'g 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 135; Estate
of Woodward v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1995-523 (“The privilege of filing a joint income tax return does not
come without a price, however. Thus, as a general rule, spouses who file joint income tax returns are jointly
and severally liable for the full amount of tax due on the combined incomes.”).
76
As mentioned in note 4, supra, in almost all cases married taxpayers face a higher liability if they
elect the married filing separately status. This holds true for two high-earners, who face a penalty on a
married filing joint return relative to what two unmarried taxpayers would pay in the aggregate yet would be
subject to an even higher liability if they elected married filing separately status.
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and more efficient to treat each taxpayer as responsible for his or her own income tax
liability? An overview of innocent spouse relief will provide context to these questions.
A.
Evolution of Innocent Spouse Relief: 1971-1998
For decades prior to 1971, spouses who filed joint returns were held jointly liable
for any resulting deficiency or underpayment. To avoid joint liability, a spouse had to
show that there was no valid joint return. Forgery was one possible defense; where a
court found that a signature was forged, it concluded that there was no joint return filed.77
Another possible defense was duress, with taxpayers arguing that a return is not joint in
the absence of both parties’ voluntary consent. Courts acknowledged that duress would
be a defense to a joint liability if it was shown that the duress existed at the time the
return was signed; however, courts defined duress narrowly and taxpayers were typically
unsuccessful in their duress claims.78
In cases where a spouse willingly signed the return, courts had no avenue to
provide relief from joint liability, no matter how sympathetic the facts. For example, in
Scudder v. Commissioner, which predated the enactment of the first innocent spouse
provision, the petitioner signed a joint return but was unaware that her husband had
embezzled money and not reported it on the return. The Service held her jointly liable
for the resulting deficiency, and the Tax Court, “with considerable reluctance,” upheld
the determination:
Although we have much sympathy for petitioner's unhappy situation and
are appalled at the harshness of this result in the instant case, the
inflexible statute leaves no room for amelioration. It would seem that
only remedial legislation can soften the impact of the rule of strict
individual liability for income taxes on the many married women who
are unknowingly subjected to its provisions by filing joint returns.79
This plea did not go unheard. The Innocent Spouse Act of 197180 was said to
have reflected the concern of Congress “about the ‘grave injustice’ imposed by joint and
77

See e.g., Dranow v. Comm’r, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1485 (1968). Forgery is to be distinguished from
signing someone else’s name with tacit consent. Thus if one spouse signs for the other, the court will uphold
joint liability where it finds that the non-signing spouse tacitly consented to the signing spouse’s action. See,
e.g., Abrams v. Comm’r, 53 T.C. 230 (1969).
78
See e.g., Stanley v. Comm’r, 45 T.C. 555, 563 (1966) (holding that the taxpayer “failed to prove
the necessary causal relationship between her fear of [her husband] and her signing of the returns”);
Federbush v. Comm’r, 34 T.C. 740, 754–58 (1960), aff’d per curiam, 325 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1963); Estate of
Aylesworth v. Comm’r, 24 T.C. 134, 145–46 (1955) (holding that taxpayer’s abuse at the hands of her
husband did not constitute duress). The Aylesworth opinion noted: “The filing of joint returns resulted in a
substantially reduced tax burden for the couple as a result of the split income provisions, and we should be
very slow to conclude that the signature of the wife is to be regarded as having been obtained by fraud or
duress.” Id. at 146.
79
Scudder v. Comm’r, 48 T.C. 36, 41 (1967). Mrs. Scudder appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which disagreed with the Tax Court that nothing could be done. It remanded the case for further
consideration of the innocence of the fraud as a defense. Scudder v. Comm’r, 405 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1968).
Another oft-cited case that included a plea for a legislative fix is Wissing v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 1428, 1432
(1970) (“We would welcome a rule which would grant relief to a victimized spouse who has no knowledge of
or reason to have knowledge of, and does not benefit from, unreported income, at least where that income is
the fruit of a crime. But we regretfully see no way in which this Court can or should engraft such a ‘doing
equity’ rule on the language of section 6013(d)(3). We think that such a result should properly be
accomplished by ameliorating legislation.”), vacated, 441 F.2d 533 (6th Cir. 1971).
80
Innocent Spouse Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-679, 84 Stat. 2063. In 1998, the innocent spouse
provisions were amended and moved to § 6015, where they remain today.
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several liability in cases in which, for example, the culpable spouse embezzles funds,
fails to report the proceeds, deserts the innocent spouse, and squanders the funds.”81 The
legislative history to the 1971 Act recognized the inequitable outcomes that sometimes
resulted from strict joint and several liability. The Senate Report on the bill noted that
“some . . . judicial decisions have carried pleas for legislative relief” and quoted the
above language from the Tax Court’s opinion in Scudder as an example.82 The report
stated that “[t]his proposal seeks to correct the unfairness in the situations brought to the
attention of this committee and to bring government tax collection practices into accord
with basic principles of equity and fairness.”83
To address these concerns, the 1971 Act added subsection (e) to § 6013,
providing potential relief for a spouse who had filed jointly if: (1) there was omitted
income in excess of twenty-five percent of the amount of the gross income reported on
the return; (2) this omitted amount was attributable to one spouse; (3) the other spouse
establishes that he or she did not know of, and had no reason to know of, such omission;
and (4) it would be inequitable to hold the other spouse liable for the deficiency
attributable to such omission, taking into account all facts and circumstances, including
whether or not the other spouse significantly benefited directly or indirectly from the
items omitted from gross income.
The notion of an “innocent” spouse has evolved considerably over time, just as
the statutory provisions for relief have been liberalized. To qualify for relief under the
1971 Act, one truly had to be uninvolved in, and unaware of, his or her spouse’s financial
activities and resulting understatement of income on the joint return. Moreover, relief
was only available if the spouse omitted twenty-five percent or more of his or her income
on the return; an otherwise innocent spouse had no relief if the omission were smaller.
Since its narrowly defined introduction in 1971, the grounds for innocent spouse relief
have been increasingly liberalized though legislative amendment and case law. Contrast
the 1971 standard for innocent spouse relief with that now available under § 6015(f),
enacted in 1998, which affords a taxpayer relief if, “taking into account all the facts and
circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the individual liable for any unpaid tax or any
deficiency (or any portion of either).”84
Over time, Congress recognized that the early versions of innocent spouse relief
were “narrowly drawn and strictly interpreted” and that many former spouses did not
qualify for those protections.85 As part of the 1996 Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 (TBOR2),
Congress directed the Treasury Department and U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO) to study whether the then-current innocent spouse provisions were providing
“meaningful relief in all cases where such relief is appropriate.”86 It also called for
studies of: (1) the effects of changing the liability on joint returns from joint and several
liability to proportionate liability (meaning “each spouse would be liable only for the
income tax attributable to the income of each spouse”87); and (2) the effects of providing
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STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 105TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO
TAX TREATMENT OF “INNOCENT SPOUSES” (Joint Comm. Print 1998) (citing S. REP. No. 91-1537, at 2 (1970)).
82
S. REP. NO. 91-1537, at 2 (1970).
83
Id.
84
I.R.C. § 6015(f)(1) (2012).
85
H.R. REP. NO. 104-506, at 30 (1996).
86
Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 401 (1996).
87
H.R. REP. NO. 104-506, at 31 (1996).
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that the Service must be bound in its collection by the allocation of joint liability agreed
upon in a divorce decree.88
Prior to the passage of TBOR2, the Treasury Department requested public
comment on these questions.89 In response, the American Bar Association (ABA) and
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) were among the groups
that submitted proposals suggesting how joint and several liability should be replaced
with proportionate liability.
In February 1998, the Treasury Department issued its report to Congress.90 The
report concluded that the existing innocent spouse provisions “may not provide
‘meaningful relief in all cases where such relief is appropriate,’”91 and it carefully
considered the alternatives to joint and several liability, including the ABA and AICPA
proposals. However, the report ultimately rejected those proposals and recommended
further modifying the innocent spouse provisions “to accommodate more cases” rather
than making fundamental changes to the joint and several liability standard.92
Congress undertook this task in 1998. In January and February of that year, the
Senate Finance Committee held hearings in which innocent spouse reform was one of a
number of items examined.93 The resulting compromise between the House and Senate,
§ 3201 of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,94 became the new § 6015 of the
Code. The new section provided alternative forms of relief in three different subsections:
6015(b), (c), and (f). Section 6015(b) is a liberalized version of the “traditional” innocent
spouse relief applicable to joint filers who could establish that they had no actual or
constructive knowledge of the item for the understatement from which they sought relief.
Section 6015(c) allows an innocent spouse to elect an allocation of the
deficiency95 such that his or her liability is limited to the portion of the deficiency
attributable only to items allocable to the taxpayer. The electing spouse must be
widowed or divorced, legally separated, or living apart (for at least twelve months) from
the spouse with whom he or she filed the joint return. The subsection includes anti-abuse
provisions to address fraudulent transfers of assets. The innocent spouse cannot have had
actual knowledge that the item giving rise to the deficiency was reported incorrectly;96
however, unlike with traditional innocent spouse relief and the expanded § 6015(b),
§ 6015(c)(3)(C) puts the burden of proof on the Service to show that the requesting
spouse had actual knowledge. Moreover, a requesting spouse who had actual knowledge
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Id.
I.R.S. Notice 96-19, 1996-1 C.B. 371.
90
See generally 1998 TREAS. REPORT ON JL & IS, supra note 22.
91
Id. at 57 (quoting Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, supra note 86).
92
See id. at 58. Part III will examine the Treasury Department’s arguments in favor of maintaining
the joint and several liability standard.
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See IRS Restructuring: Hearings on H.R. 2676 Before the S. Comm. on Fin.,105th Cong. (1998).
94
IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 2676, 105th Cong. § 3201 (1998) (enacted)
[hereinafter 1998 Act]; I.R.C. § 6015 (2012).
95
The final version of the bill did not allow for separation of liability for underpayments, as had
been proposed by the Senate amendment. However, relief for underpayments was made available in
§ 6015(f).
96
See Svetlana Attestatova, The Bonds of Joint Tax Liability Should Not Be Stronger than
Marriage: Congressional Intent Behind § 6015(c) Separation of Liability Relief, 78 WASH. L. REV. 831, 858
(2003) (including an in-depth examination of the meaning of “any item”).
89
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can overcome this requirement if the spouse is able to establish that he or she signed the
return under duress.97
In addition to these two specific, carefully designed statutory provisions,
Congress also added § 6015(f), which provides the Treasury Secretary authority to
prescribe procedures for relief from joint and several liability if, “taking into account all
the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the individual liable for any unpaid
tax or any deficiency.”98 A taxpayer is not eligible for relief under § 6015(f) unless relief
is unavailable under §§ 6015(b) and (c).99 Significantly, § 6015(f) is the only provision
that contemplates relief for an innocent spouse in the case of an underpayment. An
underpayment can result when the taxpayer files a correct return indicating a liability due,
but encloses only partial payment or no payment at all. The conference report explains
the intention “that equitable relief be available to a spouse that does not know, and had no
reason to know, that funds intended for the payment of tax were instead taken by the
other spouse for such other spouse’s benefit.”100
Given its statutory authority under § 6015, the Service developed administrative
guidance for how it would grant § 6015(f) relief.101 Over time, a combination of this and
subsequent administrative guidance, Tax Court opinions, and minor amendments to
§ 6015 have contributed to a further liberalization of the rules favoring innocent spouses.
B.
A Long Way Since Scudder – Further Liberalization of Innocent Spouse
Relief: 1998-2012
The 1998 Act was intended to expand innocent spouse relief and “provide
equitable relief in appropriate situations.”102 Over the past fourteen years, the Service has
undertaken administrative efforts to further improve the process. To name just a few
examples, the Service: (1) developed and revised Form 8857;103 (2) centralized the
processing and review of the requests in one location—the Covington, Kentucky,
Innocent Spouse Unit;104 and (3) revised letters, publications, and online tools to make
married taxpayers more aware of the consequences of joint filing and the availability of
innocent spouse relief.105 And in the past fourteen years, spouses who feel it is unfair to
97

Prior to 1998, duress was (and still is) a common law defense to joint and several liability. See
supra note 78.
98
I.R.C. § 6015(f)(1) (2012).
99
I.R.C. § 6015(f)(2) (2012).
100
H.R. REP. No. 105-599, at 254 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
101
The current guidelines are set out in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, which superseded
Revenue Procedure 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447. Notice 2012-8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309, introduced a proposed
revenue procedure that, if adopted, will supersede Revenue Procedure 2003-61. See also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6015-5 (2002).
102
H.R. REP. No. 105-599, at 254 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
103
The first version of IRS Form 8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief (And Separation of
Liability and Equitable Relief), was released in December 1998 and was a one page form with three pages of
instructions. The form has been revised five times since then and is currently under revision again. The most
recent version of the form (Rev. September 2010) is four pages long and includes five pages of separate
instructions. All versions are available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Form-8857,-Request-for-Innocent-SpouseRelief.
104
The Cincinnati Centralized Innocent Spouse Operation (CCISO) is located in Covington,
Kentucky, and was established in fiscal year 2001. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-558,
INNOCENT SPOUSE PROGRAM PERFORMANCE IMPROVED; BALANCED PERFORMANCE MEASURES NEEDED 4
(2002).
105
See, e.g., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY
TAXPAYERS, FY 2001 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 67–68. IRS Publication 971, Innocent Spouse Relief, was
originally released in 1998 and revised six times since. The current version (Rev. September 2011) is 24
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be held jointly liable have responded in kind. The Service receives an estimated fifty
thousand requests for innocent spouse relief annually and grants fewer than half of these
requests. 106
Following its grant of authority in § 6015(f), the Service developed guidance
explaining its standards for determining equitable relief. Revenue Procedure 2003-61107
set out seven threshold eligibility requirements for equitable relief108 and specified
circumstances in which equitable relief ordinarily will be granted.109 Taxpayers who
meet the threshold eligibility requirements but not the specified conditions of section 4.02
might still qualify for relief; the Service can consider all facts and circumstances and
grant relief if it finds it inequitable to hold the requesting spouse liable for all or part of
the deficiency or underpayment.110 The balancing factors include: marital status;
economic hardship; legal obligation of the nonrequesting spouse; whether the requesting
spouse benefited significantly from the unpaid liability or item giving rise to the
deficiency; the requesting spouse’s compliance with income tax laws; spousal abuse; and
mental or physical health of the requesting spouse.111
Interestingly, another of the balancing factors that the Service will consider in
determining equitable relief is whether the requesting spouse knew or had reason to know
of the underpayment or item giving rise to the understatement.112 This is a significant
departure from the pre-1998 innocent spouse relief statute, which required a spouse to
show no knowledge or reason have knowledge as one of several conditions for relief.
Under the equitable relief standard, the Service (or the Tax Court, in its review) can now
grant relief from liability to a spouse who had full knowledge of the wrongdoing when he
or she signed the return if it feels that the other factors supporting relief warrant it.
Returning to the Bozick case as an example:113 both the Service and the Tax
Court concluded that Ms. Bozick had reason to know that her husband would not pay the
$137,453 liability shown on their joint return. The record shows Ms. Bozick was aware
that he was in failing health, had credit card debt, and had a gambling problem. She
acknowledged these facts in her divorce petition and also acknowledged that he did not
keep up with his quarterly taxes and withholding. The Tax Court weighed all facts and
circumstances in its opinion, including the relief factors listed in Revenue Procedure
2003-61, but was perhaps most persuaded that it was fair to grant her relief by the fact
that “Bozick signed a joint tax return only after having been browbeaten into doing so by
her husband and after having filed a separate return.”114

pages long. The instructions to Form 1040 (Tax Year 2011) include an explanation of joint and several
liability and information about Innocent Spouse Relief; however, at 189 pages, it cannot be assured that
taxpayers will read this information in the instructions at the time of filing. The Service developed an online
Innocent Spouse Tax Relief Eligibility Explorer, which is available on the IRS website at
http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Explore-if-you-are-an-Eligible-Innocent-Spouse.
106
See supra note 19.
107
Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296.
108
Id. at § 4.01.
109
Id. at § 4.02.
110
Id. at § 4.03 (providing a nonexclusive list of eight factors that the Service will consider in
making its determination).
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
See supra note 9.
114
Bozick v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1242, 1244 (2010).

116

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.4:94

A lot of open questions remained after the 1998 Act, even after the Service
developed its administrative guidance for granting relief. For example, in the years
immediately following the 1998 Act, the Service contended that the Tax Court lacked
jurisdiction to review a denial of equitable relief brought under § 6015(f). The Tax Court
found that it did have jurisdiction over these cases.115 However, in 2006, the Ninth
Circuit held that the Court lacked jurisdiction in § 6015(f) underpayment cases where the
liability did not arise from a deficiency.116 In December 2006, Congress settled this issue
by amending § 6015(e) to make clear that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to review all
denials of relief, including § 6015(f) underpayment cases.117
The scope and standard of judicial review have been the subject of litigation in
recent years, with the Tax Court holding that the scope of review could include new
evidence introduced by the taxpayer at trial that was not in the administrative record118
and that the proper standard of review in all § 6015 relief cases is de novo.119 Despite
Tax Court decisions to the contrary,120 the Service continues to argue that the scope of
review of § 6015(f) cases should be limited to the administrative record and that abuse of
discretion is the proper standard of review.121
The cumulative impact of the 1998 Act, the 1996 amendment to § 6015(e), and
the Tax Court holdings on the scope and standard of review has been a great
liberalization and expansion of innocent spouse relief over a fourteen year period. This
was, of course, what Congress had intended when it decided in 1998 to broaden the relief
rather than eliminate joint and several liability. But to achieve “equitable” outcomes,
each determination necessarily becomes a very fact-intensive inquiry into the personal
lives and marriage of the taxpayers. If the nonrequesting spouse responds or intervenes,
115

See, e.g., Fernandez v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 324, 332 (2000); Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 36–

38 (2004).
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Comm’r v. Ewing, 439 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Bartman v. Comm’r, 446 F.3d
785, 787–88 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction under § 6015(e)(1) where there
was no deficiency).
117
I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A) (2012).
118
Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32 (2004), vacated, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006). In Porter v.
Comm’r, 130 T.C. 115, 124 (2008) [hereinafter Porter I], the Tax Court revisited the issue and upheld the
position that the court may consider evidence introduced at trial even if not included in the administrative
record. Porter I addressed the scope of review question, but did not resolve the standard of review question;
it stated that determination of the scope of review did not depend on the standard of review applied. Porter I,
130 T.C. at 122 n.10.
119
See Porter v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 203 (2009) [hereinafter Porter II] (revisiting the standard of
review question in § 6015(f) cases). Following the 1998 Act, the court used the de novo standard of review
in §§ 6015(b) and (c) cases, but held in Butler v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 276, 292 (2000) that abuse of discretion
was the appropriate standard of review in § 6015(f) equitable relief cases. In Porter II, the court revisited this
question in light of Congress’s 2006 amendments to § 6015(e)(1); it concluded that by the language of the
amendments, Congress intended the court to use a de novo scope of review and standard of review in cases
determining relief under § 6015(f). Porter II, 132 T.C. at 208. But see the dissent in Porter II, arguing that
Congress did not intend in its 2006 amendment to § 6015(e) to change the court’s standard of review from
abuse of discretion to de novo. Porter II, 132 T.C. at 233–35 (Gustafson, J., dissenting).
120
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 1, 2011 ANN. REP. TO CONG.
534–35 (2011) (citing as an example Torrisi v. Comm’r, T.C.M. 2011-235, slip op. at 17 n.15). The
Taxpayer Advocate called upon Congress to amend § 6015 to clarify that the Tax Court’s scope and standard
of review is de novo in § 6015(f) cases, stating: “[t]he IRS’s position is especially harmful to taxpayers who
cannot afford representation or assistance during administrative proceedings, or those who are victims of
domestic violence or abuse. The divergence between Counsel’s position and that of the Tax Court creates
uncertainty for taxpayers and consumes administrative and judicial resources.” Id. at 474.
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I.R.S. Notice CC-2009-021 (June 30, 2009).
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the Service and/or the Tax Court often must make a judgment in a “he-said, she-said”
presentation by the spouses.122
And as already noted, the liberalization of the statute does not mean that all or
even most requesting spouses get the relief they seek. The Taxpayer Advocate’s 2011
Annual Report to Congress included an analysis of forty-three opinions from the Tax
Court or Courts of Appeals involving relief under § 6015 for the period June 1, 2010 to
May 31, 2011.123 Of these forty-three cases, most (thirty-four cases, or 79%) involved a
reconsideration of the merits as to whether the taxpayer should be granted relief.124 Of
these cases decided on the merits, the taxpayer was granted full relief in eleven of thirtyfour cases (or 32%) and partial relief in seven cases (21%). The Service’s denial of relief
was fully upheld by the court in nearly half the cases (sixteen of thirty-four, or 47%).125
A significant number of the forty-three cases analyzed in 2011—fifteen cases, or
35%—involved procedural questions. This is common from year to year. The Lantz
case126 sparked a closely-watched bout of litigation concerning procedure for innocent
spouse relief cases, which eventually led to yet another liberalization of the relief process.
At issue in Lantz was whether a requesting spouse must request equitable relief under
§ 6015(f) within two years of the Service commencing collection activity on the
requesting spouse. The Code is clear that a taxpayer requesting relief under § 6015(b) or
(c) must do so within this two-year limit,127 but it is silent as to whether there is a time
limit for a taxpayer requesting relief under § 6015(f). Treasury Regulation 1.60155(b)(1), which was promulgated in 2002, extended this two-year limit to taxpayers
seeking equitable relief under § 6015(f).128 In Lantz¸ the Service had rejected the
taxpayer’s § 6015(f) claim as untimely because it was not within the two-year limit. The
taxpayer argued that regulation section 1.6015-5(b)(1) was an invalid interpretation of the
statute; the Tax Court agreed, found an abuse of discretion because the Service did not
consider the merits of the taxpayer’s request, and ordered further proceedings to
determine whether the taxpayer was entitled to relief.129 The Service appealed to the
Seventh Circuit, which reversed and remanded in 2010.130 In cases that would have been
appealed to a Court of Appeals that has not followed the Seventh Circuit, the Tax Court
continued to hold that the two-year deadline imposed by the Treasury Regulation was
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I.R.C. § 6015(h)(2) (2012) provides the nonrequesting spouse the statutory right to respond.
While an important procedural safeguard, the process puts the Service into the position of fact-finder in a
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spouse has the right to appeal. Rev. Proc. 2003-19, 2003-1 C.B. 371.
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Lantz v. Comm’r, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010).
127
See I.R.C. § 6015 (2012). “Collection activity” is defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(2)(i)
(2002) to mean: “a section 6330 notice; an offset of an overpayment of the requesting spouse against a
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§ 3.01(3), 1998-2 C.B. 758; Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447; Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296.
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Lantz v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 131, 150 (2009), rev’d, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010).
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invalid.131 The Service, meanwhile, continued to appeal in other circuits and win on the
issue.132
The two Lantz decisions attracted considerable attention among practitioners and
academics.133 The Taxpayer Advocate highlighted this particular issue in her 2010
Annual Report to Congress, criticizing the two-year limit and calling upon Congress to
amend § 6015(f) to clarify that a taxpayer may request equitable relief at any time before
expiration of the period of limitations on collection.134 Her recommendation gained
momentum in Congress, with members of the House and Senate sending letters to IRS
Commissioner Schulman calling upon the Service to reconsider the Treasury Regulation
in light of the intent of the 1998 Act. Senator Baucus, who was a member of the Finance
Committee at the time of the 1998 Act, stated in a press release that accompanied one
letter to Shulman:
We made important changes to protect innocent taxpayers seeking relief
from their spouses’ liability to ensure fair and equitable treatment. Now,
we are concerned this two-year limitation denies relief to the very
taxpayers the law was designed to help—the innocent spouses unaware
of these IRS collection activities because of intimidation or deception by
their spouse. We must reevaluate these limits so all taxpayers are treated
justly and have time to file for tax relief they deserve.135
The letters proved effective. In July 2011, the Service announced that it would
eliminate the two-year requirement in § 6015(f) cases; it will consider requests for
equitable relief if the statutory period for collection remains open.136 Commissioner
Shulman stated in the accompanying press release: “today’s change will help innocent
spouses victimized in the past, present, and future.”137 In the year prior to this change in
policy, over fifteen hundred requests were disallowed as untimely because relief was not
131
The Tax Court follows the precedent of a Court of Appeals in subsequent cases that would be
appealed to that particular circuit; as a result, it often rules differently according to where the appeal would
lie. See Golsen v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742, 756–57 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971).
132
The Third and Fourth Circuits followed the Seventh Circuit in upholding the regulation. See
Mannella v. Comm’r, 631 F.3d 115, 121–25 (3d Cir. 2011); Jones v. Comm’r, 642 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir.
2011). The Service filed appeals in the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, but later dropped these appeals in
light of I.R.S. Notice 2011-70, 2011-32 I.R.B. 135 (infra note 136). See Coulter v. Comm’r, T.C. No. 100309 (stipulated decision Nov. 20, 2009), appeal docketed, No. 10-680 (2nd Cir. Feb. 24, 2010); Buckner v.
Comm’r, T.C. No. 12153-09 (decided May 21, 2010), appeal docketed, No. 10-2056 (6th Cir. Aug. 18,
2010); and Carlile v. Comm’r, T.C. No. 011567-09 (decided May 26, 2010), appeal docketed, No. 10-72578
(9th Cir. Aug. 23, 2010). Despite the appeals, the Tax Court continued to hold the two-year deadline invalid
in the circuits that had not yet ruled. See, e.g., Pullins v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 432, 441–42 (2011); Kelly v.
Comm’r, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 507, 510 (2010); Hall v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 374, 382 (2010). Pullins was on
appeal in the Eighth Circuit, and both Kelly and Hall were on appeal in the Sixth Circuit; these Tax Court
opinions were filed subsequent to the Buckner opinion but prior to I.R.S. Notice 2011-70.
133
See, e.g., Patrick J. Smith, Gaps in the Seventh Circuit’s Reasoning in Lantz, 2010 TAX NOTES
TODAY 186-19 (2010) (criticizing the Seventh Circuit opinion); Bryan T. Camp, Interpreting Statutory
Silence, 2010 TAX NOTES TODAY 148-6 (2010) (analyzing the Tax Court’s decision).
134
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requested within the two-year limit.138 The new guidance is a taxpayer friendly
outcome—and good for a spouse like Ms. Lantz, whose case would have granted relief
on the merits if it had been requested timely—as it will once again broaden the
circumstances for relief. An accompanying increase in requests, however, will further
burden a system that already receives fifty thousand such requests annually.
A few months later, in January 2012, the Service released Notice 2012-8, which
introduced a proposed revenue procedure that would update and supersede Revenue
Procedure 2003-61.139 In the press release accompanying the notice, IRS Commissioner
Doug Shulman stated, “The IRS is significantly changing the way we determine innocent
spouse relief. These improvements should dramatically enhance our process to make it
fairer for victimized taxpayers facing difficult situations.”140 The notice proposes a
procedure for certain streamlined case determinations,141 which sounds as though the
Service intends to add efficiency to the process. However, it does not specify what is
meant by “streamlined.” At the same time, another section of the proposed revenue
procedure expands how the Service can weigh abuse and financial control in cases
involving an underpayment;142 while this potentially broadens the grounds for relief for
innocent spouses, it could also make the determination even more fact-intensive.
The innocent spouse relief process has evolved considerably since its debut in
1971. Relief has been expanded to include more taxpayers, and the taxpayers have been
granted more extensive rights of appeal. From a due process standpoint, these evolutions
are admirable. Congress is sympathetic to the plight of the “innocent spouse,” as was
made clear in the hearings and legislative history relating to the 1998 Act and again
recently by Senator Baucus.143 So in light of the complicated and time-consuming relief
process, why has Congress chosen not to fix the root of the problem by eliminating joint
and several liability? Part IV will offer some perspective, with the benefit of hindsight.
IV.
SOLUTIONS – REVISITING THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT’S
RECOMMENDATION TO EXPAND INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF
INSTEAD OF ELIMINATE JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
In 1996, Congress directed the Treasury Department to conduct a study of four
issues related to joint returns. The three that are relevant to this article included: (1) the
effects of changing from a joint and several liability standard to a proportionate liability
standard; (2) the effects of allowing the Service to be bound in collections efforts by the
allocation of joint liability in a divorce decree; (3) whether the innocent spouse
provisions in effect at the time “provided meaningful relief in all cases where the relief
was appropriate.”144
The Treasury Department report, which was released in February of 1998,
acknowledged that the existing joint and several liability and innocent spouse rules were
“imperfect in certain respects.”145 It considered the pros and cons of a number of various
proposals to modify or eliminate joint and several liability, and concluded that each of the
138
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proposals had both advantages and defects. The Treasury report opted instead to
recommend legislative changes that would “preserve the advantages of the current system
and yet afford innocent spouse relief in more situations.”146 Specifically, it recommended
legislation that would broaden relief in the following ways:
Automatically suspend collection efforts against one spouse when the
other is contesting a proposed joint assessment in Tax Court; Make
innocent spouse relief easier to obtain by changing statutory standards to
help additional taxpayers, including those with smaller tax bills who are
presently ineligible for relief in many cases; Give more taxpayers who are
denied innocent spouse relief by the IRS an opportunity to appeal the
decision to Tax Court, and automatically suspending collection while the
Tax Court considered the appeal.147
Before reaching that conclusion and making those recommendations for
legislative change, the Treasury report considered several alternatives. The report
considered the specific advantages and disadvantages of each proposal, including the
proposal that I advocate for in Part V of the article: to mandate separate returns for all
married individuals, thereby eliminating both joint and several liability and joint returns.
A.
A Systemic Change: Mandatory Separate Returns for all Fliers
The report considered the advantages and disadvantages of adopting a mandatory
separate return system from the perspective of both the taxpayer and the Service.
Mandated separate return filing is my favored solution because I believe it is unfair to
force married filers to choose between joint liability and unfavorable tax treatment. The
report commented in a footnote that mandated separate filing would “arguably be
inconsistent with horizontal equity, one of the economic goals of taxation, because
similar families would be taxed differently based on the division of income between
spouses.”148 As I argue below, this argument is antiquated in that it presumes that a
family unit consists of a married couple.
Another primary concern the report raised for taxpayers is that mandated separate
filing would increase the administrative burden for couples, who would have to file two
tax returns annually instead of one joint return. The report noted that this would be
especially burdensome for couples with jointly held income-producing assets or jointly
held assets, such as a primary residence, that create a deduction.149 It noted that because
a comparatively small number of taxpayers choose the “married filing separately” status,
questions arising in those cases were addressed on a case-by-case basis, but that if
mandated separate filing were adopted, then “[c]omprehensive rules would need to be
implemented, most likely through legislation, to instruct taxpayers and the Service on
how to allocate any number of items between the spouses.”150 Perhaps because the
numbers are insignificant relative to joint filers, the report does not address the situation
146
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in which unmarried people own income-producing property jointly, yet file an individual
return.
From the perspective of IRS administration, the report noted that mandatory
separate filing would be burdensome insofar as the Service would have to process fortynine million additional tax returns annually. However, as I discussed in Part II.B, the IRS
e-file program has helped to streamline return processing, and the number of taxpayers
participating in the e-file program has nearly quadrupled since 1998.151
B.
Less Comprehensive Proposals: Proportionate Liability, Allocated
Liability, and Adoption of the Divorce Decree
Another line of proposals in the Treasury report contemplated preserving joint
filing while allowing married couples to separate their joint liability. For example, the
ABA Tax Section Committee on Domestic Relations proposed what became known as
“back end proportionate liability,” whereby a married couple could allocate and separate
a tax liability or assessment in two situations: (1) upon election by one spouse in the case
of an underpayment; and (2) “upon the assertion of a deficiency of tax” during an
exam.152 Thus, married couples would continue to enjoy the benefits of income splitting
but in many cases could avoid joint liability attributable to the tax items of the other
spouse. AICPA introduced a different proposal, which became known as the “Allocated
Liability Standard,” which would permit married taxpayers to file jointly and provide, at
their complete discretion, their own agreed-upon allocation of the aggregate liability at
filing.153 The report rejected both the ABA and AICPA proposals on the grounds that
neither would fully eliminate the need for equitable or innocent spouse relief.154
A third proposal would require the Service to be bound by the terms of a divorce
decree regarding the responsibility for tax liabilities on prior joint returns. Congress had
considered such a proposal previously but was troubled by the fact that the Service is not
a party to the divorce proceeding.155
C.
Judging With the Benefit of Hindsight – Did Treasury Make the Right
Recommendation in 1998? The Unending Inefficiencies of the Innocent
Spouse Process
Ultimately, in 1998 Congress followed the report’s recommendations and
retained joint and several liability while expanding the grounds for innocent spouse relief.
In hindsight, was this the right decision?
The report raised legitimate concerns about the increased administrative costs to
both the taxpayer and the Service if a mandatory separate filing service were adopted.
However, since the time of the report, e-filing has changed the administrative landscape
considerably.156 To the extent that return processing is increasingly automated, the
number of returns filed is less relevant than it once was.
Meanwhile, the expansion of innocent spouse reform has broadened the grounds
for relief and created new administrative burdens. The expansion has resulted in a
151
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corresponding increase in the number of requests for innocent spouse relief, with each
request requiring a time-consuming and personalized determination. The Service and
Tax Court are now expending significant resources to investigate claims of spousal
abuse, economic hardship, and other highly factual non-tax questions such as an
individual’s level of knowledge (i.e., which spouse knew what facts about items of
income).157
Unsurprisingly, given the task at hand, the Service has not been getting the
results right. In 2007, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA)
performed an audit to examine certain procedures that had been established to protect the
rights of spouses requesting Innocent Spouse relief.158 Specifically, the procedures were
designed to ensure that collection enforcement was suspended against the requesting
spouse (but not against the nonrequesting spouse) while the relief request was pending;
for example, while the request is under consideration, the requesting spouse’s refund
should not be offset to satisfy the joint liability that is at issue. However, TIGTA found
that in twenty-seven percent of the accounts it reviewed, the Service had not acted timely
to ensure that the proper protections were in place.159
Richard C.E. Beck, who made a compelling argument for the repeal of joint and
several liability in a 1990 article,160 re-examined the issue following the Restructuring
and Reform Act of 1998.161 In his re-examination, Beck describes the high
administrative costs of expanding innocent spouse relief in 1998 (as compared to
abolishing joint and several liability). Beck cites IRS statistics describing how the
Service created a central processing center for Innocent Spouse claims and assigned 953
full-time employees to work exclusively on those claims;162 despite this redirection of
resources, it took the Service an average of 192 days to process claims for relief that were
granted at the administrative level and it took an astounding 807 days to process claims
that were appealed within the Service.163 Within the context of the significant resources
the Service redirected toward innocent spouse relief, Beck examined the innocent spouse
cases that were litigated in 2005 and found the following:
Summing up, it seems fair to say that there are now more cases than
before the 1998 reforms, and that the law and the decisions are more
complex, but that there is no more certainty, consistency or rationality in
the case law than before. And because the ratio of wins and losses
appears very similar in samples taken nearly twenty years apart, one may
perhaps conclude also that the quality and consistency of the
administrative dispositions are also no better now than before.164
Beck argues that joint and several liability should be repealed because it is a
system that lacks any justification and results in an intolerable “tax persecution of
157
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women.”165 He points out that “[t]he United States is virtually the only country in the
developed world which insists upon [joint and several liability], even among countries
which permit income-splitting to married persons filing jointly.”166
I agree with Beck that the 1998 expansion of innocent spouse relief was a failure.
I believe that the Service should focus its resources on the proper administration of the
tax law. Congress should not expect the Service to investigate or judge intimate
questions of family relations. Similarly, these cases are a burden on the Tax Court’s
docket, and the court is no better suited to determine “innocence” than the Service is.
The extensive litigation and advocacy regarding the two-year rule in Lantz and its
companion cases is only the latest example of the tremendous resources that have been
poured into innocent spouse relief. Beck argues that the innocent spouse rules will never
be satisfactory, because “innocence is an irrational basis for relief and can never be made
rigorous or consistent.”167
In response to such critiques by Beck and other scholars, Stephanie Hunter
McMahon conducted an empirical study of innocent spouse decisions to determine
whether courts are implementing Congress’s legislative intent.168 She aggregated the
results from 444 cases and concluded that “courts apply their own interpretation of
congressional intent, only loosely confined by the terms provided by the executive
agency.”169 McMahon elaborates on the courts’ interpretation of the factors set out by the
Treasury Department in Revenue Procedure 2003-61 and describes some of the trends
she found in her study. She calls for clearer guidelines to be established by Congress and
definitions by the Treasury Department, finding it problematic that “in their opinions
judges are neither crafting precise definitions of many of . . . [the terms described in the
Revenue Procedure] nor defining the relative importance of each.”170
McMahon does not agree with Beck’s statement that innocent spouse relief has
“degenerate[d] into a global subjective test of whether the spouse seeking relief can move
the judge to sympathy,”171 but she does conclude from her study that litigating innocent
spouse relief “can be complicated and costly for both taxpayers and the government” and
that “[as] with all equity claims, the factors considered by the courts may be
inconsistently applied.”172
In my view, the Treasury Department’s solution of “afford[ing] innocent spouse
relief in more situations”173 has fallen short in providing relief, while simultaneously
burdening the system with time-consuming claims. It is time for Congress to return to
the drawing board and reconsider the message that was delivered during the 1998
testimony it heard from those who suffered because of joint liability.
Instead of expecting the Code to resolve complex family dynamics, Congress
should reassess and take a bold step in the opposite direction: it should stop
differentiating taxpayers according to family dynamics. Perhaps seventy-five years ago it
165
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made sense for Congress to divide taxpayers into two distinct groups based on marital
status. But it is time for Congress to disentangle the Code from marital status, and this
can be accomplished in harmony with a broader movement towards simplification of the
Code. The solution is to ignore marital status and, in doing so, to reject the long-accepted
premise that married couples behave as one economic unit.174
V.
NEITHER THE CODE NOR AMERICA LOOKS LIKE IT DID IN 1938 (OR
EVEN 1975): WHY CONGRESS SHOULD AGAIN REVISIT THE CALL
FOR MANDATORY SEPARATE FILING
As described in Part IV, there are many ways to address the problems that arise
from joint and several liability. Many of the solutions would not require large scale
modifications to the Code. One example, contemplated by the Treasury Department
Report, is that Congress could require the Service to respect the allocation of tax liability
for past years agreed upon in the divorce decree.175 The Service could create a one-page
form on which the taxpayers could allocate the liability and sign as part of divorce
proceedings; once submitted to the Service, the taxpayers’ accounts could be adjusted
accordingly.176
This solution would be simple to enact and relatively easy to administer; it is
desirable insofar as it would eliminate the need for the innocent spouse process.177
However, it would do so without a thoughtful reconsideration of the rationales of joint
and several liability, the policy underlying marital rates, or the various grounds for
penalizing taxpayers who file separately. As I will describe in this part, tax policy has
not kept pace with demographic changes in the United States and there are important
reasons to reconsider the Code’s underlying assumptions about households.
Moreover, the time is ripe for ambitious statutory changes. Faced with a growing
deficit and following the historic U.S. credit downgrade by Standard & Poor’s, there is
talk among policymakers of fundamentally revisiting the Code.
Since 2010,
commentators, politicians, and government officials have increasingly turned their
collective attention to the national debt. Several tax policy groups, including the
bipartisan National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform established by
174
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President Obama, have released tax reform recommendations. They are united in calling
for major changes to the Code with a move towards simplification—closing loopholes by
eliminating certain deductions in order to broaden the base and in turn reduce individual
rates.178 In that spirit, there may be a window of opportunity for fundamental, systemic
changes to the Code. The proposal to move to mandatory separate returns for all filers, a
striking departure from the longstanding U.S. tax system that would eliminate the
distinction between married and single filers, would fit within such a call for
simplification and could be enacted as part of a broader overhaul of the Code.
It is a new century; simply put, the United States does not look like it did in 1938
when joint and several liability was adopted. Importantly, neither does the Code. There
are many good policy reasons for Congress to revisit the Code’s overly simplistic
assumptions about households. After a brief examination of the current demographics, I
will focus on the unfair conundrum faced by low-income families headed by married
couples as one way in which the married filing jointly status is particularly antiquated and
counter-productive in today’s America.
A.
A Closer Look at the Changing Demographics
In 1993, Marjorie Kornhauser wrote about the demographic trends at that time,
which were already reflecting “the decline of the traditional nuclear family and an
increase in the number of divorces, single-parent families, nonmarried cohabitation, and
two-earner families.”179 She noted that nonmarital households increased nearly four
hundred percent from 1970 to March 1991, 180 leading her to re-examine the concept of
“family.” At the same time, Kornhauser examined the premise that married couples act
as one economic unit by sharing or pooling all income.181 Her conclusion, based upon
her own empirical study and the work of several others, was that not all married couples
pool their assets and the pooling of assets is not confined to married couples.182 She
further concluded that even among those couples who profess to pool assets, “in reality
the nonearner spouse often does not have equal access to assets; instead the earner
controls the money.”183 She concludes, as I do, that the joint return should be
abolished.184
In the nearly twenty years since Kornhauser’s article, the divorce rate has held
steady but the percentage of unmarried cohabitating couples has risen. A recent Pew
Research Center analysis of census data revealed that only 51% of adults in the United
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States were married in 2010.185 This number represents a record low and a 5% decline in
new marriages from the prior year.186 In contrast, 72% of all adults were married in the
year 1960. While the rate of marriage has dropped, the census data shows that other
types of households, including cohabiting couples, single-person households, and singleparent households, have grown in recent decades. The percentage of divorced or
separated adults was 14% in 2010; this number has remained somewhat steady in the past
twenty years, though the number represents a stark contrast to the 5% who were divorced
in 1960.187 Meanwhile, public opinion about marriage mirrors the decline: 39% of
Americans surveyed in 2010 answered affirmatively when asked the question, “Is
marriage becoming obsolete?”188 A greater percentage of young adults (44% of those
ages 18 to 29) than older adults (32% of those over 65) agreed that marriage is becoming
obsolete.189 A greater percentage of adults with a high school education or less (45%)
agreed that marriage is becoming obsolete as compared to those adults with a college
degree (27% of whom agreed with the statement).190
The Pew statistics also reveal a greater divergence over time in marital rates
among those with a high school education or less as compared to those with college
degrees.191 In 1960, 72% of adults with a high school education or less were married; in
2010, only 47% of this same demographic was married.192 While the rate of marriage has
also declined among those with a college degree, the decline is less dramatic: from 76%
in 1960 to 64% in 2010.193
Why are these changing demographics of relevance? One reason, which I
examine in sub-part V.B, is that married low-income taxpayers are disproportionately
impacted by their filing status options. A low-income married couple receives little or no
benefit from filing jointly as compared to a similarly situated unmarried couple. At the
same time, they must accept joint and several liability when they choose this status. If,
however, the married couple files separately, there is a punitive outcome: they lose their
eligibility to claim the earned income credit.
While this conclusion focuses on the example of low-income taxpayers, there are
numerous other ways in which changing demographics are rendering the policy
assumptions of the Code incoherent, and other scholars have argued that the joint return
should be abolished for different policy reasons. For example, Lily Kahng cites changing
demographics and the relative increase in the number of single people in her argument
that abolishing the joint return is a matter of fairness.194 Anthony Infanti has also
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proposed mandatory individual filing, citing changing demographics in his argument for
a more inclusive notion of what constitutes a family.195
B.
Low-Income Households Are Disproportionately Affected by the Filing
Status Options for Married Persons: Why the Code Should Tax the Type
of Household, Not the Relationship
Part III examined the historical rationales for joint and several liability. As the
Bozick case illustrates, a one-earner married couple with a high income enjoys a
tremendous benefit from the income splitting a Revisiting the Treasury Department’s
Recommendation to Expand llowed by the married filing jointly rate structure. But for
low-income married couples, the benefits of income splitting are not as measurable.
Instead it is the eligibility for the earned income credit that is at stake by filing jointly.196
Even if one agrees197 that joint and several liability is an acceptable “price” to pay for the
benefit of income splitting, one cannot ignore the fact that many low-income taxpayers
do not enjoy this benefit. Yet they too are held jointly liable, and as noted previously,
low-income taxpayers are the most likely to request innocent spouse relief.198
As an illustration of this problem, consider the following four scenarios, each
involving the same facts: a married couple has two minor children; they live together all
year, which means they must file either a joint return or married filing separately. The
Code does not permit them to file as single. Assume that in tax year 2010,199 the husband
earned $25,000. The wife, who worked only part-time, earned $8,000. Both taxpayers
are wage earners. The following alternative scenarios illustrate how widely the couple’s
tax situation varies depending on filing status.
Scenario 1: If the couple filed “married filing jointly,” the taxpayers would be
due a refund of $3,897.200
Scenario 2: If the couple filed “married filing separately,” with the husband
claiming the two children as dependents, the result is much different: the husband would
be entitled to a refund of $1,162,201 while the wife would be due no refund.202
195
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As a household unit, the couple has a far less favorable tax outcome with
“married filing separately” status. Their aggregate refund is $1,162, which is $2,735 less
than they received as joint filers. There are two reasons for this. The primary reason is
that taxpayers filing married filing separately are ineligible for the earned income credit,
regardless of income level. As joint filers, they received a $2,600 earned income credit
on their return. Separately, they receive nothing.
A second reason, though far less significant as a dollar amount, is that they lost
the benefit of income splitting. Even though both taxpayers are in the ten-percent bracket
for “married filing separately,” the wife “wastes” part of her personal exemption because
she only earned $8,000.203 When both spouses aggregated their incomes on a joint return,
the husband benefited from the portion of her personal exemption that she didn’t need.
But this example illustrates how insignificant the benefit of income splitting is to a lowincome couple: in this case, the tax savings attributable to income splitting was only
$135—far less than the amount of the benefit that the earned income credit provided.
Put differently, in Scenario 2, the couple suffered the loss of two benefits of joint
filing—income splitting and the earned income credit—with the loss of the latter costing
the couple nearly twenty times more in tax savings than the loss of the former. As
discussed below, the earned income credit did not exist when Congress considered the
“benefits” of joint filing status and adopted joint and several liability in 1938; the
lawmakers were thinking only of the ability for couples to offset one spouse’s losses
against the other’s income. Income splitting became a second, justifiable rationale in
1948 when the new rate schedule for married taxpayers was adopted, creating a marriage
bonus. But any marriage bonus today because of income splitting is modest for lowincome taxpayers, and is dwarfed in significance by the earned income credit.
Scenario 3: Suppose there is a couple that is similarly situated to the couple in
Scenarios 1 and 2, but has decided not to marry. They live together as committed
domestic partners and raise their two minor children together. Their incomes are exactly
the same as the other couple. First assume that each individual files as “single,” as they
are entitled to do, and that the male partner (the higher earner) claimed both children:204
the male partner would have received a refund of $4,392205 and the female partner would
have received a refund of $416.206 As a household, the aggregate refund is $4,808, which
is $911 more than the refund that the married couple filing jointly received in Scenario 1.
Why? As a single filer, each taxpayer is eligible for earned income credit based
upon their income and without regard to the other taxpayer’s income. Thus, their total
earned income credit as two single people is $3,646; as a married couple, it was $2,600.
The male partner owes slightly more in preliminary tax liability, because he lost the $135
receive any earned income credit because I.R.C. § 32(d) (2012) disallows it for “married filing separately”
returns.
202
She has no preliminary liability due to her standard deduction and personal exemption, and she
will not receive any refundable credits.
203
Her adjusted gross income was $8,000. Her standard deduction of $5,700 plus her personal
exemption of $3,650 equals a total of $9,350. However, one cannot have a negative taxable income. Thus,
she could have earned an additional $1,350 before being subject to any tax liability.
204
It would be rational for the partners to allocate the children to the higher earner, because the
lower earner benefits considerably less from the corresponding dependency exemptions and child tax credit.
205
The male partner’s preliminary liability of $838 would be eliminated by the child tax credit; his
refund of $4,392 consists of a $3,230 earned income credit and a $1,162 additional child tax credit.
206
The female partner’s preliminary liability was $0; her refund is attributable to a $416 earned
income credit.
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benefit of income splitting; however, the $1,046 increase in their household earned
income credit well outweighs the household’s $135 tax increase.
Why do two unmarried taxpayers sharing a household receive a significantly
higher earned income credit than a married couple, in a scenario where the household
income is exactly the same?207 Because the earned income credit is determined by
income level and filing status, not by household composition. Thus, in Scenario 3, we
see a disincentive for low-income taxpayers with children to marry. In reality, Scenario 4
illustrates how the unmarried couple will likely attain an even larger household tax
refund than that shown in Scenario 3.
Scenario 4: If the higher earner of the couple in Scenario 3, in this case the male
partner, qualifies for “head of household”208 filing status, the father’s refund will be
$4,662,209 while the female partner’s refund remains $416. In the aggregate, the couple
receives a refund of $5,078, which is $1,181 more than a similarly situated married
couple would receive.
The wildly disparate results shown in Scenarios 1 to 4 show that, under these
facts, the hypothetical couple is better off from an income tax perspective if they are
unmarried rather than married. If unmarried, they will avoid the pitfalls of joint and
several liability. But if married, they cannot do so without being further penalized if they
elect separate filing status. It does not make sense to incentivize a married couple to file
jointly (thus introducing a potential risk to the “innocent spouse”) while allowing a
similarly situated unmarried couple to avoid joint liability yet receive higher refunds.
This is one of many reasons for which I conclude that Congress must move
beyond joint and several liability and joint filing. Both the country and the tax code have
changed considerably since 1938, and it is time to revisit the suitability of this structure.

207
Note that this is not this is not always the case: as the earned income credit phases out according
to adjusted gross income, it phases out at a lower adjusted gross income level for unmarried filers than for
married filing jointly. For example, in 2010, a head of household filer with two children and an adjusted
gross income of $42,000 will receive no earned income credit, while a married filing jointly couple with two
children and a combined adjusted gross income of $42,000 will receive a $705 earned income credit. The
married filing jointly couple will receive no earned income credit once their adjusted gross income reaches
$45,373.
208
See I.R.C. § 2(b) (2012). The father will be eligible because he is unmarried, maintains a
household with a qualifying child, and furnishes more than half the cost of maintaining the household. The
head of household status was enacted in 1951 as a way to extend tax relief to single persons with dependents:
“The income of a head of household who must maintain a home for a child, for example, is likely to be
shared with the child to the extent necessary to maintain the home, and raise and educate the child. This, it is
believed, justifies the extension of some of the benefits of income splitting. The hardship appears particularly
severe in the case of the individual with children to raise who, upon the death of his spouse, finds himself in
the position not only of being denied the spouse’s aid in raising the children, but under present law also may
find his tax load heavier.” H.R. REP. No. 82-586, at 11 (1951). Extrapolating from this Congressional intent,
it is somewhat illogical then that a two-income unmarried couple raising children together should benefit
from a provision intended for single parents. But there is no provision limiting the status to those who
maintain a household without support from another adult. This is a further and arguably more egregious
example of the “unmarriage bonus” and a result that flies in the face of the policy intended by Congress.
209
The father’s rate remains the same regardless of filing status, but the standard deduction for
“head of household” in 2010 was $8,400, while the standard deduction for “single” was only $5,700. Thus,
his taxable income is $2,700 less in Scenario 4 than in Scenario 3. In turn, this lower taxable income reduces
his preliminary tax liability by $270, which creates a corresponding $270 increase in his refundable
additional child tax credit. The father’s preliminary tax of $568 is eliminated by the child tax credit, and his
$4,662 refund consists of a $3,230 earned income credit and a $1,432 additional child tax credit.
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1.

Isolating the Impact of the Earned Income Credit in the LowIncome Context
Scenarios 1 to 4 highlight some disturbing inconsistencies with the intended tax
policy, all stemming from the complexity and the value of the refundable earned income
credit in its current incarnation. First, why should taxpayers be ineligible for the earned
income credit merely because they file separately, if they would meet the income limits
for eligibility as a couple? If the couple wishes to preserve separate liability, so as to
avoid the types of legal difficulties that arise under joint and several liability, then they
must forsake their earned income credit eligibility.210 Second, why should an unmarried
couple living together receive a higher total earned income credit than a similarly situated
married couple? A couple sharing household expenses will face the same household
costs irrespective of marital status, but the unmarried couple benefits more in this case.
This scenario demonstrates a financial disincentive for the couple to marry. One reason
for these inconsistencies in tax policy is that the earned income credit was introduced
decades after joint and several liability, and the original purpose and scope of the earned
income credit were quite different than what the program accomplishes today.
The earned income credit was first introduced in the Tax Reduction Act of 1975,
which was a temporary stimulus measure enacted to address the weak economy and high
unemployment at the time.211 The earned income credit itself was to be temporary: as
originally enacted, it was effective only for tax year 1975.212 The legislative history
describes the credit as appearing to have the same two objectives as the work bonus plan
that had been proposed several times and not passed: (1) “as a way of decreasing work
disincentives” for persons on welfare; and (2) as a way of addressing the regressive
nature of social security taxes.213 The maximum earned income credit available in 1975
was $400, and it was available only to low-income taxpayers (both unmarried and
married) with a dependent child in their household.214 The credit began to phase out if
the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income exceeded $4,000, and a taxpayer with an adjusted
gross income of $8,000 or more would receive no credit at all. As is still the case today,
210

In the case of a married couple, both spouses’ incomes must be considered when determining
earned income credit eligibility. If, however, the spouses’ aggregate income is within the income limits, it
does not seem fair to deny both spouses the earned income credit for filing separately. However, a problem
may arise later if one spouse is determined to have understated his or her income. If in fact the husband
earned not $25,000 but $50,000, then neither spouse should be eligible under current law. If married
taxpayers filing separately were allowed the earned income credit, but were later ineligible due to
underreporting by one spouse, it would affect both spouses’ earned income credit eligibility. Should the
underreporting spouse bear the sole responsibility, including the liability arising from the other spouse’s
incorrect receipt of the earned income credit?
211
See generally H.R. REP. NO. 94-19 (1975).
212
Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 209(b), 89 Stat. 26, 35.
213
JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAX’N, 94TH CONG., ANALYSIS OF THE HOUSE VERSION OF THE TAX
REDUCTION ACT OF 1975 (H.R. 2166) AND POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES 33 (Comm. Print 1975). See also S. REP.
NO. 94-36, at 11 (1975) (elaborating on the earned income credit as follows: “This new refundable credit will
provide relief to families who currently pay little or no income tax. These people have been hurt the most by
rising food and energy costs. Also, in almost all cases, they are subject to the social security payroll tax on
their earnings. Because it will increase their after-tax earnings, the new credit, in effect, provides an added
bonus or incentive for low-income people to work, and therefore, should be of importance in inducing
individuals with families receiving Federal assistance to support themselves. Moreover, the refundable credit
is expected to be effective in stimulating the economy because the low-income people are expected to spend
a large fraction of their increased disposable incomes.”).
214
Tax Reduction Act of 1975 § 204. As originally enacted, it appeared in § 43 of the Code. The
earned income credit is currently found in I.R.C. § 32 (2012).
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the credit as originally introduced was available to a married couple only if a joint return
was filed; a couple filing separately could not receive the credit.215
The earned income credit, of course, was extended beyond the 1975 tax year and
has been expanded repeatedly over the years. Today it holds an incredibly significant
benefit for low-income taxpayers. Unlike in 1975, it is currently available even to certain
low-income taxpayers who do not have children. The credit is calculated based on
income and phases out at different maximum income levels that vary depending on
whether a taxpayer is unmarried or married filing jointly; the phase-out levels increase
according to whether the taxpayer has no children, one child, two children, or three or
more children.216 The amount of the maximum credit increases in the same manner. For
example: in 2010, a taxpayer with no qualifying children is eligible to receive a
maximum credit of $457, and the credit phases out to zero if the taxpayer’s adjusted gross
income is $13,460 or more (or $18,470 if married filing jointly). A taxpayer with one
qualifying child can receive up to $3,050, but will receive nothing if the taxpayer’s
adjusted gross income is $35,535 or more (or $40,545 if married filing jointly). A
taxpayer with two qualifying children can receive up to $5,036, but the credit phases out
to zero at an adjusted gross income of $40,363 (or $45,373 if married filing jointly).
Finally, a taxpayer with three or more qualifying children might receive up to $5,666,
with the credit phasing out to zero at an adjusted gross income of $43,352 (or $48,362 if
married filing jointly).
There is evidence that the earned income credit not only lifts families out of
poverty but benefits children in more meaningful ways.217 For example, a recent study
by Gordon Dahl and Lance Lochner estimated the impact of the increase in family
income due to expansions in the earned income credit program.218 Dahl and Lochner
concluded that their data indicated “modest but encouraging effects of family income on
children’s scholastic achievement.”219 If one accepts this conclusion as an influencing
215
I.R.C. § 32(d) (2012). The legislative history does not provide a clear rationale for denying a
credit to married couples filing separately. One possibility is that Congress wanted to keep the credit simple
to administer. H.R. REP. NO. 94-19, at 30–31 (1975) provides: “The credit is to be calculated on a return-byreturn basis. Individuals who are married and filing a joint return are eligible for only one credit on the
combined income of both individuals. Married individuals filing separate returns are not eligible for the
credit.” The Senate Report 94-36 contains nearly identical language with no further elaboration. S. REP. NO.
94-36, at 35 (1975).
216
The provision that increased the earned income credit for a taxpayer with three or more children
was enacted as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat.
115. It was intended as a temporary measure only for tax years 2009 and 2010; however, it was extended
through 2012 by the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization and Job Creation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296.
217
JIMMY CHARITE, INDIVAR DUTTA-GUPTA & CHUCK MARR, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, STUDIES SHOW EARNED INCOME CREDIT ENCOURAGES WORK AND SUCCESS IN SCHOOL AND
REDUCES POVERTY (2012) available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/6-26-12tax.pdf.
218
GORDON B. DAHL & LANCE LOCHNER, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE IMPACT OF
FAMILY INCOME ON CHILD ACHIEVEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE EARNED INCOME CREDIT (2011) available at
http://dss.ucsd.edu/~gdahl/papers/children-and-EITC.pdf. The authors conclude from their baseline estimates
that a $1,000 increase in income raises a child’s contemporaneous math and reading test scores by 6% of a
standard deviation. They conclude that their estimates “suggest that the effects are larger for children
growing up in more disadvantaged families, younger children, and boys.” Id. at 1951. See also CHARITE,
DUTTA-GUPTA & MARR, supra note 217, at 2, 8–10 (citing a number of different studies in support of the
report’s statement that “[a] small but growing body of research indicates that lifting the incomes of lowincome families helps children in those families do better in school” and is “associated with a significant
increase in the child’s earnings in adulthood.”).
219
DAHL & LOCHNER, supra note 218, at 1949.
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consideration of tax policy, then it is even more nonsensical to link eligibility for the
earned income credit to joint and several liability.
2.
Isolating the Impact of the Marriage Bonus in the Low-Income
Context
Ignoring the impact of the earned income credit, the marriage bonus is far less
pronounced for low-income taxpayers, especially those who can claim exemptions for
one or more dependent children, because their rates are relatively low compared to those
of high-income taxpayers. Yet there are scenarios in which the marriage bonus exists for
low-income couples, so it should also be examined as a “privilege” of filing jointly in this
context. If Congress moved to individual filing, low-income taxpayers would stand to
lose whatever marriage bonus attributable to income splitting they now enjoy.
The most noticeable marriage bonus would result in a one-earner household with
no children.220 Staying within the context of low-income earners, imagine that one
spouse earned $40,000 and the second spouse earned no income: the marriage bonus
would be $1,822, all of which is attributable to income splitting and the extra personal
exemption (a childless couple will receive no earned income credit at this income level).
This amount is a significant sum for a couple with a household income of only $40,000.
However, it is questionable as a matter of tax policy whether the Code should incentivize
a one-earner household when there are no children. This scenario lacks the obvious
compelling factor, namely child rearing, to justify the second earner’s lack of
participation in the labor market. Meanwhile, the non-earner is left financially vulnerable
in the event of divorce or the earner’s death. If Congress moved to mandatory separate
filing, this couple would lose the $1,822 benefit of income splitting, but the non-earner
would not bear the risk of an unforeseen individual tax liability. Additionally, the Code
would no longer provide a disincentive (real or perceived) for the non-earner to enter the
labor force by virtue of marital status.221
The marriage bonus is less pronounced if the same couple has two children, such
that one spouse earns $40,000 and the second spouse earns no income because he or she
has elected to stay at home with their small children. In that case, the amount of the
marriage bonus attributable to income splitting and the second spouse’s personal
exemption is $1,101 as compared to an unmarried person filing as head of household.222
Again, while a high-income one-earner couple would receive a far greater marriage
bonus, $1,101 is not an insignificant sum for a low-income couple. Ironically, if the
second spouse in this example were to work part-time and earn as little as $6,000, the
couple would completely phase out of earned income credit eligibility. Thus, there are
220
The absence of children means that the couple will not reduce its liability through dependency
exemptions, thus the marriage bonus is more pronounced.
221
One could argue that the very existence of an income tax is a disincentive to work. I do not
accept this argument, but I do accept the argument that income splitting currently provides a rational
incentive for one spouse to work less or not at all, because the additional income negates the marriage bonus
as it increases. Separate filing would place all individuals in similar situations with respect to income and tax
liability, because the existence of the additional income would not impact the liability of a spouse.
222
I have purposely ignored the earned income credit in this calculation so as to make a comparison
only of the benefits of income splitting in this case. If the marriage bonus is calculated as including the
earned income credit, then the bonus is $2,156, because the married couple filing jointly would receive an
earned income credit of $1,126 while the unmarried filer would receive a credit of only $71. This is due to
the fact that the income phase out for the credit is higher for married taxpayers. However, if both couples
earned $50,000, or if both couples earned $40,000 but had no children, then neither couple would be eligible
for the earned income credit.
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two separate tax disincentives for the second spouse to stay out of the work force in this
hypothetical.
In any event, the calculus regarding a marriage bonus as a disincentive to work is
far more complex when small children are present, because the couple will incur day care
costs if the second spouse enters the work force; the second earner will have to earn a
certain minimum amount to offset those costs, while simultaneously reducing the
marriage bonus (and the earned income credit) with his or her earnings. Thus, it is often
not rational for low-income families with children to follow the two-earner model.
However, there are other ways to address the costs of raising children, whether those
costs are borne as day care expenses or the opportunity cost of the second earner staying
home.
C.
A Brief Consideration of How to Restructure the Earned Income Credit
in an Individual Filing System
If Congress mandated individual filing, it would have to decide how to structure
the credits currently available to households headed by married couples. One specific
question is whether Congress would aggregate the spouse’s separate income for purposes
of determining the earned income credit. As noted above, it does not now do so for
cohabiting couples. Should married couples be treated differently? If one does not
accept the premise of marriage as an economic unit, then arguably the Code should not
aggregate the spouses’ incomes. Zelenak examined the pros and cons of this question in
his 1994 article, noting that:
If a wife of a high income husband earns a few thousand dollars . . . [t]he
premises of separate returns—marriage neutrality and the independent
economic identities of spouses—indicate that she should be eligible for
the credit. But the credit is intended to help the poor, and she is not
poor.223
It is true that she is not poor, but Congress should not ignore the fact that many
marriages end in divorce,224 and she may be better positioned to support herself after a
divorce if she maintains a presence in the work force throughout her marriage.
Furthermore, if her high-earning spouse claimed the children as dependents on his return,
as he is likely to do, then her separate entitlement to an earned income credit would be
nominal.225
Zelenak suggested that, were Congress to adopt mandatory individual filing, a
better alternative to retaining the current earned income credit system would be to
223
Zelenak, supra note 24, at 398–99. He concludes his article by noting that “[t]here is no
absolutely right or wrong way to tax married couples . . . . Whatever the merits of joint returns may have
been for mid-twentieth century America, the joint-return system fits poorly with American attitudes and
living patterns at the close of the century.”). Id. at 404–05.
224
PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW FAMILIES 38 (2010). The
report notes that the divorce rate rose sharply after 1960, peaked in 1979, and has declined since that time.
The report further suggests that the decline in the divorce rate reflects the simultaneous decline in marriage.
Id.
225
Each child would allow the husband a dependency exemption of $3,700 in 2011. Depending on
the husband’s income, he may also be eligible for a child tax credit of up to $1,000 in 2011. The wife
earning a few thousand dollars, on the other hand, would have no tax liability and would not earn enough to
receive any portion of the child tax credit. Without qualifying children to claim, her earned income credit
could not exceed $464 and might be less; it would roughly offset her FICA taxes, which was the original
legislative intent of the earned income credit.
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redesign the credit.226 As Zelenak notes, George Yin and Jonathan Barry Forman
proposed a family-based credit that could work well in a separate return system.227 Yin
and Forman contemplated a two-pronged program: an exemption from Social Security
taxes for the working poor, and a refundable credit for low-income taxpayers based on
the number of children in the home.228
If Congress desires a substantial subsidy for low-income households with
children as a matter of tax policy, as the current Code supports through refundable
credits, it seems reasonable to believe that such a credit could be completely
disaggregated from filing status. A married couple should not benefit less from such a
subsidy than a cohabiting couple, and a wife should not bear the risk of being held
responsible for her husband’s tax shortcomings in a program designed to benefit her
children.
VI.
CONCLUSION
When the Senate Finance Committee held its Restructuring Hearings in 1998,
Senator William Roth opened the discussion on innocent spouse tax rules by highlighting
the plight of the low-income ex-wife who was struggling to make it as a single parent:
Financially insecure, many times struggling as a single parent to raise
children, working for an income that is a fraction of what her ex-spouse
earns, now she has to confront the often unrelenting Internal Revenue
Service. In an effort to acquire revenues owed, the agency will pursue
these women with a vengeance. It will garnish wages, place liens against
homes, and often jeopardize future relationships because a new person in
her life might well be held accountable for her former spouse’s tax
problems.229
Despite the extensive legislative reform that followed these hearings in 1998 and
years of further statutory, judicial, and administrative liberalization of the innocent
spouse rules, joint liability continues to adversely impact low-income women. Rather
than continuing to expand the grounds and factors for relief, subjecting these women to
an invasive relief process that takes many months if not years to resolve, Congress should
revisit its antiquated assumptions about joint filing and move to mandatory individual
filing.
While this will create ripple effects throughout the Code,230 it is also an
opportunity to move towards simplification and to update the Code in light of the
changing demographic realities of the United States.
Bearing in mind the continued decline of marriage rates (which is most
pronounced among the least educated)231 and the potential impact of family income on a

226

Zelenak, supra note 24, at 400–01.
See George K. Yin & Jonathan Barry Forman, Redesigning the Earned Income Tax Credit
Program to Provide More Effective Assistance for the Working Poor, 59 TAX NOTES 951 (1993).
228
Id. at 957–60.
229
IRS Restructuring: Hearings on H.R. 2676 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 105th Cong. 142
(1998).
230
Many Code sections provide special benefits for married couples filing jointly and would need
to be amended accordingly. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 121(b)(2) (2012) (providing special rules for joint filers who
wish to claim the exclusion on gain from the sale of a principal residence).
231
PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 224, at 11 (reporting a gap of sixteen percentage points in 2008
in marriage rates between college graduates (64%) and those with a high school diploma or less (48%)).
227
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child,232 it is harmful tax policy to condition a married couple’s eligibility for the earned
income credit on the acceptance of joint and several liability while asking a divorcée to
turn to an inefficient relief process if the marriage ends. The better answer is to stop
penalizing the innocent spouse, embrace demographic reality, and simplify the filing
status structure by mandating individual filing.

232

See supra notes 217–19.

